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1 Introduction
The term ”emerging market economy” was first used in 1981 by Antoine W. Van
Agtmael of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank.
Emerging markets are economies of countries that are in the progress of be-
coming a developed country and typically are moving toward mixed or free mar-
kets. Emerging markets typically have a lower-to-middle per capita income. This
means that the per capita income of the countries’ economies is generally lower
than other more developed.Those economies have another common feature, i.e.
foreign investors can buy stocks in their financial markets. While emerging mar-
kets often have a higher rate of growth compared to developed countries, they
are often plagued by higher sociopolitical instability and volatility, indeed until
the global financial crisis banking crisis in 2008 banking crises had predominantly
been a low and middle- income country phenomenon, at least from lately 1960s;
sovereign debt crisis were exclusively matter of the emerging economies until the
2008 which brought about sovereign debt crises in development economies and
even currency crises are a rare phenomenon among developed countries, including
during the global financial crisis, in part due to the reserve currency status of some
of these economies.
According to the Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging Market In-
dex, 26 developing countries qualify as emerging markets - including Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab
Emirates.
This thesis will focus on Turkey in particular its recent currency crisis. Turkey
has been considered as an emerging economy for several decades and one among
the world’s developed countries according to the CIA World Factbook. Recently,
we witnessed that Turkey has elevated its status to an emerging power. With its
large population, growing economy, rising military power, active diplomacy and
strong national identity, Turkey has increased its outreach and influence to the
global scale. It has also increased its capacity and autonomy. Turkey has the
world’s 19th-largest nominal GDP, and 13th-largest GDP based by purchase price
parity (PPP).
However, before the latest currency crisis in 2018, Turkey experienced other
two major crisis. The first one was the currency crisis in 1994 which was caused
by typical problems of most emerging countries: high interest rate, an important
currency account deficit and public deficit. This led to a devaluation of the TL
of almost 50 percent. The second was the financial crisis in 2001 that has a
different origin which was the stabilization program and the IMF agreement in
1999. They had disastrous effect on the Turkish economy but managed to recover
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rapidly. In the following 10 years Turkish GDP has been grown by more than 5.5
percent (considering also the year of the great financial crisis) even if during the
first years of 2010s appeared warnings about a potential crisis in the forthcoming
future. Interest rates in Turkey have been relatively high over the period from
2001 until 2011, although they never reached the double digit . On the contrary,
interest rates in the advanced economies have been historically low, especially
starting from 2008. The aforementioned conditions contributed to massive capital
inflows to Turkey. These inflows have led to dramatic credit expansions, fueled
investments and generated an economic boom.
Growth in Turkey became increasingly dependent on externally-funded credit
and demand stimulus it means that a slight fall in flows can create huge disrup-
tion in the credit market and cause negative balance sheet effects for firms and,
hence, affect their investment decisions. As a result, Turkey’s economy began run-
ning above potential with a large current account deficit and high inflation. These
imbalances left the economy susceptible to a change in market sentiment that trig-
gered sizeable lira depreciation (IMF,2019), moreover to avoid financial disruptions
caused by rapid depreciation central banks in emerging economies (CBRT in this
case)keep interest rates high. In addiction, the global financial tightening in 2018
(described in a IMF resource by Tobias Adrian) hurt emerging markets and Turkey
was among the most notable victims, as it suffered from a currency crisis followed
by a recession. The Turkish Lira (TL) lost 30 per cent of its value against the
US Dollar (USD) in 2018, depreciating much further in the first eight months.
In 2019 the unemployment rate reached record level, even higher than during the
great financial crisis in 2008. The debt restructuring framework of the banking
sector, revised in October 2018, helped banks restructure loans worth 20 billion
USD, without the IMF loans ($30 millions), many are skeptic that Turkey will
never fully recover from the lasting after-effects of the August rout, underpinned
by strong dollarization and also the recent pandemic make Turkish economy more
crisis. On the other hand, according to the available data, the Turkish economy
slipped into recession in the second half of 2018, although the average annual
growth remain positive at 2.8 percent also 2019 followed the residues of 2018 in
the first with two quarters in slightly recession but it ends with a steep growth
that ensured a positive sign (0.9 percent).
The paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 offers a brief presentation of the
definition of financial crises, which category are inside the family of financial crises
and the similarities among the different types of crises. Section 3 and 4 describe in
a more detailed way two types of crises: banking and currency respectively. Section
5 is about credit booms; how are defined, methodology to classify them and the
correlation with output and financial crises. Section 6 offers an overview of the last
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40 years of economic events in Turkey, starting from the idea of financialisation and
finishing with 2018 currency crisis and the present of Turkey (late 2018-early 2020).
Section 7 is the experimental part of this paper: firstly will be reported the model
of currency crises from Krugman Flood and Garber, then it will be compared with
Turkish data to understand if this model fit with the case of Turkey even if some
assumptions differs from the basic model. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Financial crisis
Crises are, at a certain level, extreme manifestations of the interactions between
the financial sector and the real economy. The financial crisis can be defined as
the disruption in financial markets, the negative impact of the performance of
financial institutions or intermediary institutions in financial markets, and this
negative effect spreads to the whole economy and causes the resources not to be
distributed effectively. (Kalkavan and Ersin, 2019).
2.1 Type of financial crisis
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) distinguish two types of crises: those classified using
strictly quantitative definitions; and those dependent largely on qualitative and
judgmental analysis. The first group mainly includes currency and sudden stop
crises and the second group contains debt and banking crises. Regardless, defi-
nitions are strongly influenced by the theories trying to explain crises (Claessens
and Kose, 2013).
While financial crises can take various shapes and forms, the literature has
been able to arrive at concrete definitions of many types of crises. First group give
a definition for the two type of crisis:
1. a currency crisis involves a speculative attack on the currency resulting in a
devaluation, or forcing the authorities to defend the currency by expending
large amount of international reserves, or sharply raising interest rates, or
imposing capital controls;
2. a sudden stop can be defined as a large fall in international capital inflows
or a sharp reversal in aggregate capital flows to a country, likely taking place
in conjunction with a sharp rise in its credit spreads;
since these are measurable variables, they lend themselves to the use of quan-
titative methodologies (Claessen et al.,2013).
The other group variables are not easy to measure, allow them more to the use
of qualitative methodologies. This group is associated to adverse debt dynamics
and banking system turmoil (Claessen and Rose,2013):
1. foreign debt crisis takes place when a country cannot service its foreign debt.
It can take the form of a sovereign or private debt crisis;
2. a domestic public debt crisis takes place when a country does not honor its
domestic fiscal obligations in real terms, either by defaulting explicitly, or by
inflating or otherwise debasing its currency, or by employing some (other)
forms of financial repression
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3. a systemic banking can induce banks to suspend the convertibility of their
liabilities or compel the government to intervene to prevent this by extending
liquidity and capital assistance on a large scale.
Now I am going to briefly introduce currency and banking crisis (since Section
2 and Section 3 are focus on this type of crisis) and explain in a little bit widen
way sudden stops quantitative models and debt crisis.
Figure 1: Average of financial crises over the decades
Taken by Claessens and Rose(2013)
Currency crisis theories have evolved over the time and moved the focus from
a a focus on the fundamental causes of currency crises, to emphasizing the scope
for multiple equilibria, and to stressing the role of financial variables, especially
changes in balance sheets, in triggering currency crises. Three are the model to
explain currency crisis. The first generation model is based on the paper of Krug-
man (1979) and Flood and Garber (1983) and hence called ’KFG’ model. The
second generation models stresse the importance equilibria; many authors work
on this topic (Obsterfeld and Rogoff, 1986; Flood and Marion, 1997; Frankel and
Rose, 1996 and many others). The third generation model explores how rapid
deteriorations of balance sheets associated with fluctuations in asset prices, can
lead to currency crises. Also those models include the role played by the banks
and the self-fulfilling nature.
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Sudden stop models deal with disruptions in the supply of external financing.
These models resemble the latest generation of currency crises models in that they
also focus on balance sheet mismatches – notably currency, but also maturity – in
financial and corporate sectors (Calvo et al., 2006). These models can account for
the current account reversals and the real exchange rate depreciation typically ob-
served during crises in emerging markets. The models explain less well the typical
sharp drops in output and total factor productivity (TFP); models with financial
frictions help to account better for the dynamics of output and productivity in
sudden stops but in most models, a sudden stop with currency crisis generates an
increase in output, rather than a drop. This happens due to an abnormal raising
in net exports resulting from the currency depreciation. This has led to various
theories explaining why sudden stops in capital flows are associated with wide
output losses. Models typically include Fisherian channels and financial accelera-
tor mechanisms, or frictions in labor markets, to generate an output drop during
a sudden stop, without losing the ability to account for the movements of other
variables(Claessens and Kose,2013). These types of amplification mechanisms can
make small shocks cause sudden stops. Relatively small shocks can trigger collat-
eral constraints on debt and working capital, especially when borrowing levels are
high relative to asset values. Fisher’s style debt-deflation mechanisms can then
cause sudden stops through a spiraling decline in asset prices and holdings of col-
lateral assets (Fisher, 1933). Generally sudden stops occur in which country small
tradable sector and large foreign exchange liabilities (Claessens et al.,2013). Main
papers on this topic are (Calvo et al.,2004 and 2008; Milesi-Ferretti,2011 and Rose
and Spiegel,2011).
Theories on foreign debt crises and default are closely linked to those explaining
sovereign lending.a sovereign debt restructuring can be defined as an exchange of
outstanding sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt
instruments or cash through a legal process. Sovereign debt, here, refers to debt
issued or guaranteed by the government of a sovereign state.
One can generally distinguish two main elements in a debt restructuring (Das
et al.,2012):
1. Debt rescheduling, which can be defined as a lengthening of maturities of the
old debt, possibly involving lower interest rates. Debt reschedulings imply
debt relief, as they shift contractual payments into the future;
2. Debt reduction, which can be defined as a reduction in the face (nominal)
value of the old instruments
Default events and debt restructurings are closely related but not identical. A
default is the failure of a government to make a principal or interest payment on
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due time. Models developed rely, as a gross simplification, on either intertemporal
or intratemporal sanctions. Intertemporal sanctions arise because of a threat of
cutoff from future lending if a country defaults (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). These
models imply that inability or unwillingness to pay, while default, can result from
different factors. Such models are unable, however, to fully account why sovereigns
default and why creditors lend as much as they do. Many models actually pre-
dict that default does not happen in equilibrium as creditors and debtors avoid
the dead-weight costs of default and renegotiate debt payments (Claessens and
Kose,2013). countries do not always default when times are bad, as most models
predict: Tomz and Wright (2007) report that in only 62 percent of defaults cases
output was below trend.
Since 1998, with the debt crises in Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine, there have
been 17 distressed sovereign bond exchanges with foreign bondholders in 13 coun-
tries. In addition, there have been six bond restructurings mainly aimed at domes-
tic creditors (Ukraine (1998), Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), Uruguay (2003),
Dominican Republic (2005), and Jamaica (2010)). This does not mean, however,
that bank debt restructurings are a phenomenon of the past. Recent loan restruc-
turings include a number of debt buybacks in low-income countries, but also bank
debt restructurings such as in Pakistan (1999), Serbia and Montenegro (2004), the
Dominican Republic (2005), and Iraq (2006) (Das et al.,2012).
Although domestic debt crises episodes have been prevalent throughout history,
these events had received only limited attention in the literature until recently.
Economic theory assigns a trivial role to domestic debt crises since models often
assume that governments always honor their domestic debt obligations —the typ-
ical assumption is of the “risk-free” government assets. However, recent reviews
of history (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) shows that few countries were able to es-
cape default on domestic debt, with often adverse economic consequences. Debt
defaults in the form of inflation are often followed by currency crashes. In the
past, countries would often “debase” their currency by reducing the metal content
of coins or switching to another metal. This reduced the real value of government
debt and thus provided fiscal relief (Claessens and Rose,2013).
Banking crisis are quite common, but maybe the least understood type. Banks
are inherently fragile, making them subject to runs by depositors and giving rise
to possible problem of coordination. Moreover, problems of individual banks can
quickly spread to the whole banking system. Banks heavily depend on the infor-
mation, legal and judicial environments to make investment choices and collect on
their loans. With institutional weaknesses, risks increase. Coordination problems
arise when investors and/or institutions take actions merely out of fear that others
also take similar actions. The typical example of coordination problem is the bank
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run (the primal reference is Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
2.2 Similarities across the crises
Although the relative importance of the sources of the current crisis will be de-
bated for some time, the run-up to the current episode shares at least four major
features with earlier episodes: rapid increases in asset prices; credit booms; a
dramatic expansion in marginal loans; and regulation and supervision that failed
to keep up with developments (Claessens et al.,2013). Combined, these factors
sharply increased the risk of a financial crisis.
Asset Price boom and busts. While the specific sector experiencing a boom
can vary across crises, asset price booms are common. Sharp increases in asset
prices, sometimes called bubbles, and often followed by crashes have been around
for centuries. Asset prices sometimes seem to deviate from what fundamentals
would suggest and exhibit patterns different than predictions of standard models
with perfect financial markets. A bubble, an extreme form of such deviation, can be
defined as “the part of a grossly upward asset price movement that is unexplainable
based on fundamentals” (Garber, 2000).Such historical cases include the Dutch
Tulip Mania from 1634 to 1637, the French Mississippi Bubble in 1719-20, and the
South Sea Bubble in the United Kingdom in 1720 (Garber, 2000).During the great
financial crisis was house prices that sharply increased prior to the crisis, including
in the U.S., the U.K., Iceland, Ireland, Spain and other markets that subsequently
ran into problems.
Formal models attempting to explain asset price bubbles have been developed
for some time. Some of these models consider how individual rational behavior
can lead to collective mispricing, which in turn can result in bubbles. Others rely
on microeconomic distortions that can lead to mispricing. Some others assume
“irrationality” on the part of investors. Although there are parallels, explaining
asset price busts (such as fire-sales) often requires accounting for different factors
than explaining bubbles (Claessens and Kose,2013). In the first group of model,
for example, Blanchard and Watson (1982), under rational expectations, the asset
price does not need to equal its fundamental value, leading to “rational” bubbles.
Credit boom and busts. Later, in Section 4, I will focus on this topic; now I
only give a little introduction. A rapid increase in credit is another common thread
running through the narratives of events prior to financial crises. While historically
not all credit booms end up in a crisis, the probability of a crisis increases with a
boom, especially the larger its size and the longer its duration. The mechanisms
linking credit booms to crises include increases in the leverage of borrowers and
lenders, and a decline in lending standards. In the recent episode, both channels
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were at work. Increased leverage, in part due to inadequate oversight, left house-
holds vulnerable to a decline in house prices, a tightening in credit conditions and a
slowdown in economic activity (Claessens et al.2013). Both distant past and more
recent crises episodes typically witnessed a period of significant growth in credit
(and external financing), followed by busts in credit markets along with sharp
corrections in asset prices. The patterns before the East Asian financial crisis in
the late-1990s resembled those of the earlier ones in Nordic countries as banking
systems collapsed following periods of rapid credit growth related to investment
in real estate. Credit booms can be triggered by a wide range of factors, including
shocks and structural changes in markets. Sharp increases in international finan-
cial flows can amplify credit booms. Most national financial markets are affected
by global conditions, even more so today, making asset bubbles easily spill across
borders. Many authors uses model to find correlations between credit booms and
financial crisis, in particular banking and currency crisis.
Figure 2: Coincidence of booms and financial crises (in percentage)
Taken by Claessens and Rose(2013
Marginal Loans and Systemic Risk.Credit booms or rapid growths in fi-
nancial markets, are often associated with a deterioration in lending standards. In
2008, in the USA a large portion of the mortgage expansion consisted of loans ex-
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tended to borrowers with limited credit (FICO score under 500) and employment
histories, and often on terms poorly suited to the borrowers’ conditions. Debt ser-
vicing and repayment were, hence, vulnerable to economic downturns and changes
in credit and monetary conditions. This maximized default correlations across
loans,confirmed ex-post through high non-performing loans(Claessens et al.2013).
Such exposures had been common before, for example in the corporate and finan-
cial sectors before the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.
Poorly designed liberalization. Poorly developed or regulated domestic
financial systems have often ended up unable to intermediate large capital inflows
effectively in the wake of capital account liberalizations. Deficiencies in oversight
often led to currency and maturity mismatches and to large and concentrated credit
risks (Claessens et al.,2013). In past, shadow banking, the market of derivatives
grew so much that create the potential to become a systemic risk.
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3 Banking crisis
Laeven and Valencia (2013) defined a banking crisis as an event that meets two
condition:
1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquida-
tions).
2. Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant
losses in the banking system.
Laeven and Valencia(2017) consider the first year that both criteria are met to
be the year when the crisis became systemic to ensure that date the crisis at the
first signs of major problems in the banking system. When the losses in the bank-
ing sector and liquidations are severe, they treat the first criterion as a sufficient
condition to date a systemic banking crisis. Losses are severe when: a country’s
banking system exhibits significant losses resulting in a share of nonperforming
loans above 20 percent of total loans or bank closures of at least 20 percent of
banking system assets or fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are suf-
ficiently high, exceeding 5 percent of GDP. Laeven and Valencia (2017) consider
policy interventions in the banking sector to be significant if at least three out of
the following six measures have been used:
1. deposit freezes and/or bank holidays;
2. significant bank nationalizations;
3. bank restructuring fiscal costs (at least 3 percent of GDP);
4. extensive liquidity support (at least 5 percent of deposits and liabilities to
nonresidents);
5. significant guarantees put in place; and
6. significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP);
The above categories cover all policy interventions that have been employed to
resolve a banking crisis (Honohan and Laeven, 2005, and Laeven and Valencia,
2008). Since not all policies are used in all crises, we require that at least three
measures have been put in place. It is worth noting that setting thresholds suffi-
ciently high helps us avoid labeling a non-systemic event or the preemptive use of
some of these policies as a systemic banking crisis.
The policy variables that Laeven and Valencia (2017) used in crisis definition
are more specifically defined as follows:
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1. Deposit freeze and bank holidays: indicates whether the government intro-
duced restrictions on deposit withdrawals or a bank holiday. If implemented,
we also collect information on the duration of the deposit freeze and bank
holiday, and the affected instruments.
2. Significant nationalizations: takeovers by the government of systemically
important financial institutions, including cases where the government takes
a majority stake in the capital of such financial institutions.
3. Significant bank guarantees: a significant government guarantee on bank
liabilities, indicating that either a full protection of liabilities has been issued
by the government or that government guarantees have been extended to
non-deposit liabilities of banks. Actions that only raise the level of deposit
insurance coverage are not included.
4. Liquidity support: It is measured as central bank claims on other depository
institutions (from IFS) and liquidity support directly provided by the Trea-
sury. We normalize this variable by the total deposits and bank liabilities to
non-residents. We consider liquidity support to be extensive when this ratio
exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level.
5. Bank restructuring costs: defined as gross fiscal outlays directed to the re-
structuring of the financial sector, with the most important component be-
ing recapitalization costs. We consider restructuring costs to be significant
if they exceed 3 percent of GDP, excluding liquidity assistance provided di-
rectly from the treasury. We focus on gross fiscal costs instead of net because
it takes time to record recoveries. However, wherever data on recoveries were
available we report also net fiscal costs.
6. Asset purchases: This variable refers to purchases of assets from financial
institutions implemented by the central bank, the treasury, or a government
entity (such as an asset management company). We define significant asset
purchases as those exceeding 5 percent of GDP.
Laeven and Valencia choose this approach to date banking crises is to reduce
the use of subjective criteria in identifying these events, which gives an advantage
over existing databases in addiction it focuses only on systemic events, where
subjectivity in the identification of crises is further reduced. And finally, it is a
relatively simple definition that allows a consistent implementation across time
periods and countries of different income levels. More recent studies have explored
alternative crisis dating strategies, such as Romer and Romer (2017), who rely
on a narrative approach to identify episodes of financial distress in 24 OECD
countries; Baron and others (2018), who identify crises in 46 countries by looking
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at large declines in banks’ stock prices; and Chaudron and de Haan (2014), who
study four crises for which the timing strongly differs across databases. Chaudron
and de Haan (2014) conclude that using information on the number and size of
bank failures allows determining the timing of banking crises more precisely. Their
dating for these four episodes corresponds closely with ours. More generally, all
these studies note important similarities with our crisis dating to the extent that
the samples overlap. However, our approach allows a more comprehensive coverage
of countries.
3.1 Banking crises causes
Banks are inherently fragile, making them subject to runs by depositors. More-
over, problems of individual banks can quickly spread to the whole banking system.
While public safety nets – including deposit insurance – can limit this risk, public
support comes with distortions that can actually increase the likelihood of a crisis.
Institutional weaknesses can also elevate the risk of a crisis. For example, banks
heavily depend on the information, legal and judicial environments to make pru-
dent investment decisions and collect on their loans (Claessens and Kose,2013).
With institutional weaknesses, risks can be higher. While banking crises have oc-
curred over centuries and exhibited some common patterns, their timing remains
empirically hard to pin down.
Financial institutions are inherently fragile entities, giving rise to many pos-
sible coordination problems. Because of their roles in maturity transformation
and liquidity creation, financial institutions operate with highly leveraged balance
sheets. Hence, banking, and other similar forms of financial intermediation, can
be precarious undertakings. Fragility makes coordination, or lack thereof, a major
challenge in financial markets. Coordination problems arise when investors and/or
institutions take actions – like withdrawing liquidity or capital – merely out of fear
that others also take similar actions. Given this fragility, a crisis can easily take
place, where large amounts of liquidity or capital are withdrawn because of a self-
fulfilling belief – it happens because investors fear it will happen (Laeven and Va-
lencia,2017). Small shocks, whether real or financial, can translate into turmoil in
markets and even a financial crisis. A simple example of a coordination problem
is a bank run. It is a truism that banks borrow short and lend long. This matu-
rity transformation reflects preferences of consumers and borrowers. A run occurs
when a large number of customers withdraw their deposits because they believe
the bank is, or might become, insolvent. As a bank run proceeds, it generates its
own momentum, leading to a self- fulfilling prophecy (or perverse feedback loop):
as more people withdraw their deposits, the likelihood of default increases, and
this encourages further withdrawals. This can destabilize the bank to the point
where it faces bankruptcy as it cannot liquidate assets fast enough to cover its
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short-term liabilities.
Furthermore, micro-prudential regulation, with supervision to enforce rules, is
designed to reduce risky behavior of individual financial institutions and can help
engineer stability. Deposit insurance can eliminate concerns of small depositors
and can help reduce coordination problems. Lender of last resort facilities (i.e.,
central banks) can provide short-run liquidity to banks during periods of elevated
financial stress. Policy interventions by public sector, such as public guarantees,
capital support and purchases of non-performing assets, can mitigate systemic
risk when financial turmoil hits(Laeven and Valencia,2013). Although regulation
and safety net measures can help, when poorly designed or implemented they can
increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. Regulations aim to reduce fragilities
(for example, limits on balance sheet mismatches stemming from interest rate,
exchange rate, maturity mismatches, or certain activities of financial institutions).
Regulation (and supervision), however, often finds itself playing catch up with
innovation. And it can be poorly designed or implemented.
Although funding and liquidity problems can be triggers or proximate causes,
a broader perspective shows that banking crises often relate to problems in asset
markets. Banking crises may appear to originate from the liability side, but they
typically reflect solvency issues. Banks often run into problems when many of
their loans go sour or when securities quickly lose their value.Problems in asset
markets, such as those related to the subprime and other mortgage loans, also
played a major role part during the great financial crisis of 2008.
Although the exact causal sources are often not easy to understand and dis-
cover, and risks can be difficult to forecast before, looking back banking crises and
other financial panics are rarely random events. Panics can also be policy induced.
Panics can take place when some banks experience difficulties and governments
intervene in an ad-hoc manner, two examples are Thailand in 1997 and Argentina
in 2001.
3.2 Banking crises episodes
Laeven and Valencia (2017) definition identifies 151 banking crises since 1970,
of which 4 episodes started since 2011: Cyprus (2011), Guinea Bissau (2014),
Moldova (2014), and Ukraine (2014). The complete dataset is included in the
accompanying data file with the main variables reported in the appendix. The
banking crises dates—years for all cases, and year and month whenever feasi-
ble—include borderline systemic crises, defined as cases where our definition is
close to being met. Most countries have experienced at least one systemic banking
crisis during 1970–2017, with many going through multiple episodes (Figure 3).
However, only three countries experienced more than two systemic banking crises
during the past 48 years: Argentina (4), the Democratic Republic of Congo (3),
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and Ukraine (3).
Figure 3: Frequency of banking crisis
Taken by Laeven and Valencia (2017)
Following the World Bank’s historical income classification, they classify episodes
according to the income level of the affected country at the start of the crisis. Sys-
temic banking crises are not single-country events, starting with the episodes in
Latin America in the early 1980s, the crises in the aftermath of the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the Tequila Crisis, the Asian crisis, and more recently the global
financial crisis. The period around the mid-2000s was unusual in terms of the low
incidence of crises, which was disrupted by the global financial crisis. Since then,
globally we are facing again a period of relative calm. Late eighties and nineties
included some episodes in high-income countries, reflecting the savings and loans
crisis in the United States, the crises in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s,
and the one in Japan in the late 1990s. However, prior to the 2008 global financial
crises, banking crises had predominantly located towards low and middle- income
country phenomenon.
As noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the global financial crisis made it
clear that “financial crises are an equal opportunity menace” for high-and low and
middle-income countries.
3.3 Crisis response
The authority of a country have usually responded by using three type of instru-
ment. First central bank response to bank distress typically includes the deploy-
ment of liquidity support to the banking sector, particularly in response to bank
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Table 1: Financial crisis from 1970
Data taken from Laeven and Valencia database (2017)
runs. The provision of extensive liquidity support during systemic banking crises
is pervasive in our sample.During the early stages of banking crises, and often in
combination with liquidity support,governments have introduced state guarantees
on interbank deposits aimed at preventing a collapse of the interbank market,
to help stem bank runs and alleviate liquidity pressures on these entities. They
typically buy policymakers time to develop more comprehensive resolution and
restructuring plans. Laeven and Valencia (2012) examine the experience of 42
crisis episodes, of which 14 made use of explicit guarantees on bank liabilities and
find that these guarantees do help to reduce liquidity pressures on banks. Alto-
gether, they report in their database 34 crisis episodes where blanket guarantees
were announced, of which 19 cases corresponded to high-income countries, mostly
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Guarantees are often left in place for many
years and are only gradually removed. At end-2016, European Union governments
collectively still had 120 billion euros in outstanding guarantees issued in support
of the financial system, according to the European Commission’s 2017 State Aid
Scoreboard. While this amount represents a sharp decline from its peak of 835
billion euros in 2009, it remains non-trivial.
In cases where liquidity pressures have been significant, countries have in some
cases resorted to administrative measures, suspending the convertibility of deposits
into cash and restricting foreign payments. These “deposit freezes” have often been
preceded by bank holidays—the temporary closure of banks—often by design as
banks need some time to adapt their IT systems and procedures to the new regime.
However, bank holidays and deposit freezes have been rarely used.
In 70 percent of episodes for which Laeven and Valencia (2012) collected data,
a deposit insurance scheme was already in place when the crisis erupted. Moreover,
the data show that emerging economies are more likely to adopt deposit insurance
around the time of a crisis. Only in 40 percent of cases, losses are imposed on
bank creditors, suggesting that implicit guarantees are important (Laeven and
Valencia,2012).
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3.4 Banking crisis remedies and output
The solutions in the short-term will invariably involve a return of Keynesian eco-
nomics. First and foremost governments will have to sustain aggregate demand
by increased spending in the face of dwindling tax revenues. Large budget deficits
will be inevitable and also desirable. Attempts at balancing government budgets
would not work, as it would likely lead to Keynes’ savings paradox. As private
agents attempt to increase savings (because they reduce their consumption plans)
the decline in production and national income actually prevents them from doing
so. This paradox can only be solved by government dissaving.
Second, in the process of recapitalising banks, governments will substitute pri-
vate debt for government debt.
Bank recapitalization is a tool that has been used in most crises that Laeven
and Valencia (2017) report in their database in particular in high-income countries,
and it is also the most important component of direct fiscal costs from government
intervention in the financial sector. Government capital injections, encompassing
often a combination of preferred and common equity, have also been accompanied
by conditions or restrictions, for instance requiring board seats for government rep-
resentatives, and limiting or prohibiting dividend payments (Laeven and Valencia,
2008). These recapitalizations can often lead governments to own a majority share
of a bank’s capital, in which cases we classify the intervention as a nationalization,
together with outright nationalization cases.
Third, governments and central banks will also have to support asset prices, in
particular stock prices. The deleveraging process of the banking system will con-
tinue to put downward pressure on asset prices. In order to stop this, governments
and central banks may be forced to intervene directly in stock markets and to buy
shares.(De Grauwe,2008).
Laeven and Valencia (2017) database is conform to these solution only for the
high-income countries since short-term interest rates declined to a median level
very close to zero in the year after the start of the crisis, from a median of about
5 percent and also the median primary balance tends to deteriorate sharply in
high-income countries; while in the low and middle-income the median short-term
interest rate increases in low and middle-income countries this is due to concerns
about currency depreciation and the impact on private balance sheets exposed
to an exchange risk at the time of financial distress force these countries to raise
interest rate.
Although the trend of primary balance moves in opposite direction both groups
increase in public debt, the median of the three years after the banking crisis
reaches 21.1 percent of GDP and 16.4 percent of GDP in low and middle-income
countries.
Cerra and Saxena (2008), employing panel data from 192 countries, find strong
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Figure 4: Debt over GDP increment in banking crisis period
Taken by Laeven and Valencia (2017)
evidence of a large reduction in economic output. Similar evidence is provided by
Cecchetti et al. (2009); looking at 40 crises since 1980, their results show sharp
and persistent contractions in output. Hoggarth et al. (2002) suggest that output
loss is about 15-20% of annual GDP, on average. Reinhart and Rogoff document
that unemployment rises, on average, for five years with an average rate of seven
percentage points. Real GDP per capita falls by an average of about nine per
cent, and the duration of the economic downturn is two years. Housing and equity
markets are severely hit; the decline is about 35% and 56%, respectively. Laeven
and Valencia (2017) report output losses associated with banking crises episodes,
computed as deviations of actual GDP from its trend. Output losses in high-
income countries tend to be much larger than those in low and middle-income
countries this gap could be explained by the presence of larger and deeper financial




A currency crisis can be broadly defined as any situation in the foreign exchange
markets where a currency suddenly and/or unexpectedly loses substantial value
relative to other currencies. For an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, a
currency crisis usually refers to a situation in which the economy is under pressure
to give up the prevailing exchange rate peg or regime. In a successful attack the
currency depreciates, while an unsuccessful attack may leave the exchange rate
unchanged, but at the cost of spent foreign exchange reserves or a higher domestic
interest rate. A speculative attack often leads to a sharp exchange rate depreciation
despite a strong policy response to defend the currency value.
The question here is how big a change in the exchange rate is qualified as
a currency crisis(Frankel and Rose, 1996; Glick and Moreno, 1999). A lot of
paper determine an arbitrary threshold; if the indicator value exceeds this specified
threshold, any month, quarter or year is classified as a crisis episode.
For Frankel and Rose (1996), an annual depreciation of at least 25% is consid-
ered as currency crisis. For the countries with high inflation rates and correspond-
ingly high rates of depreciation, the authors put another criterion to not consider
each of these depreciations as an in dependent crisis episode: the change in the
exchange rate should also exceed the previous year’s change in the exchange rate
by a margin of at least 10%.
For Moreno and Glick (1999) episodes of sharp currency depreciation for each
country are defined as those in which the percentage change in the exchange rate
exceeds the mean plus two standard deviation, computed over the full sample
period.
Others define a currency crisis those cases where caused by potential early
warning indicators or under speculative pressure. In this second definition are
included both the situation where there is an effective speculative depreciation and
where the authority defend the currency by selling the reserves or rising interest
rate. This speculative situation can be predicted by some indicators in particular:
the behavior of international reserves, the real exchange rate, domestic credit,
credit to public sector and domestic inflation (Kaminsky et al. 1998). This second
definition is also referred to as Fiscal Pressure Index (FPI) in literature.
Both approaches have strengths, but also weaknesses. The devaluation ap-
proach may be criticized for its limited crisis definition given that every speculative
attack leads to some economic cost even if the attack is successfully defended by
the government. Thus, this methodology mostly captures currency crashes, but
not necessarily currency crises as pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1996).
However, this approach might be justified, because speculative attacks lead in
general to depreciation of the currency, particularly in emerging market economies.
Hence, including foreign reserves and interest rates may not have any effect on
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the crisis indicator. Including foreign reserves and interest rates may lead to a
misleading interpretation of crisis. Frankel and Rose (1996) consider that reserve
movements are notoriously noisy measures of exchange market intervention for
almost all countries (in particular in Thailand 1997). Glick and Moreno (1999)
explain this issue by the fact that government interventions in currency markets
may be used for debt payments, not only to defend the currency.
On the other hand, the inclusion of interest rates into the crisis index is crit-
icized for two reasons. First, some authors like Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
argue that the data on market-determined interest rates in developing countries is
incomplete and inadequate.
Selling reserves and rising interest rates are the more frequent practical tools
used by monetary authorities to face speculative attacks. This defence policy tries
to stabilize the exchange rate. Therefore, it is justified to consider currency crises
as high pressures on the currency. The inclusion of reserves and interest rates as
a measure of crisis incidence allows one to observe an increase in market pressure
that may not be captured through changes in exchange rate (Ari and Cergibozan
2016). This is particularly meaningful for countries that adopted fixed exchange
rate regime, where capital outflows and crisis are manifest through larger drops
in reserves and/or increasing interest rates rather than exchange rate weaknesses
(Frankel and Saravelos, 2010).
4.1 Currency crisis models
Starting from those definitions there are three generations of models that typi-
cally are used to explain a currency crisis and Claessens and Kose (2013) describe
comprehensively:
1. The first generation of models are so called the ”KFG” and derive from the
model of Krugman (1979). They show that a sudden speculative attack on
a fixed or pegged currency can result from rational behavior by investors
who correctly foresee that a government has been running excessive deficits
financed with central bank credit. Investors continue to hold the currency
as long as they expect the exchange rate regime remain intact, but they
start dumping it when they anticipate that the peg is about to end. This
run leads the central bank to quickly lose its liquid assets or hard foreign
currency supporting the exchange rate. The currency then collapses.
2. The second generation of models stresses the importance of multiple equilib-
ria.These models show that doubts about whether a government is willing to
maintain its exchange rate peg could lead to multiple equilibria and currency
crises (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1986)and a speculative currency attack can take
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place and succeed even though current policy is not inconsistent with the ex-
change rate commitment.This is because the policies implemented to defend
a particular exchange rate level, such as raising domestic interest rates, may
also raise the costs of defense by dampening economic activity and/or rais-
ing bank funding costs. The private sector understands the dilemma facing
the government, and may question the commitment to fixed exchange rate
when other macroeconomic objectives are compromised.The second genera-
tion models are in part motivated by episodes like the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism crisis, where countries like the UK came under pressure
in 1992 and ended up devaluing, even though other outcomes (that were
consistent with macroeconomic fundamentals) were possible too.
3. The third generation of crisis models explores how rapid deteriorations of bal-
ance sheets associated with fluctuations in asset prices, including exchange
rates, can lead to currency crises. Some models stress how distortions may
emerge in the form of credit constraints. Aghion, Bacchetta, and Baner-
jee (2001), for example, highlight that an initial depreciation of a currency
raises the cost of foreign-currency debt obligations of firms and lowers prof-
its, which in turn may limit borrowing capacity when credit is constrained.
The subsequent fall in investment and output associated with these borrow-
ing limitations may lower the demand for domestic currency and trigger a
currency crisis.
There are other third-generation models highlight how financial liberaliza-
tion and government guarantees of private sector liabilities can generate
moral hazard and unsustainable fiscal deficits that can lead to crises (McKin-
non and Pill,1995;Chang and Velasco,2002; Dooley, 2000).These models are
largely motivated by the Asian crises of the late 1990s.
4.2 Currency crises episodes
Currency crises are often associated with other types of financial crises, such as
banking crises. The occurrence of so-called twin crises may be attributable to
a number of channels of causation: a bank crisis leading to a currency crisis, a
currency crisis leading to a bank crisis, or joint causality.
A bank run can cause a currency attack if the increased liquidity associated
with a government bailout of the troubled banks erodes their ability to maintain
the prevailing exchange rate commitment (Velasco, 1987; Calvo, 1997). Or, as
discussed above, a weak banking sector may precipitate a currency crisis if specu-
lators anticipate that policymakers would prefer to give up exchange rate stability
in order to avoid bankruptcies and further strains on the banking sector rather
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than endure the costs of defending the domestic currency (Obstfeld, 1994).A pos-
sible reverse chain of causality, from currency crises to the onset of banking crises,
is also well recognized. If banks hold significant holdings of unhedged foreign lia-
bilities, a currency crisis shock can adversely alter the banking sector directly by
causing a deterioration of bank balance sheets as currency depreciation raises the
domestic currency burden of these liabilities.
The joint occurrence of currency and banking may also reflect a response to
common factors. Banks and firms are exposed to liquidity shocks if they finance
long-term lending and investment with short-term borrowing (Chang and Velasco,
2001). Consequently, an international liquidity crunch may trigger twin crises. The
global financial crisis of 2007-08 had similar effects on currency values and banking
sector health in many countries. Although started by losses associated with sub-
prime mortgage derivative products (e.g. asset-back securities and credit default
swaps) in the U.S. and Western Europe, it quickly led to a world-wide deleveraging
process where institutions moved to limit their foreign currency exposure. A flight
to the U.S. dollar—the global reserve and payments currency—ensued, forcing
very large currency devaluations in many advanced and developing countries.
Currency crises may be associated with other types of financial crises, such
as sudden stops of foreign capital inflows, sharp rises in capital outflows, and
sovereign debt defaults. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002), for example, provide
a sudden-stop interpretation for the 2001-02 financial crisis in Argentina in which
international investors lost faith in the country’s ability to finance its growing
fiscal indebtedness while also maintainig a currency peg to the dollar at a time
that the economy was in the midst of a three year- recession. The resulting capital
flow reversal prompted a bank run, which in turn forced the end of its currency
peg and a sharp currency depreciation. The depreciation significantly worsened
the government’s already weak fiscal position and led Argentina to default on its
public debt.
Figure 5 shows the incidence of currency crises in period, 1975-2007 using data
from Laeven and Valencia (2017). They define a currency crisis as a nominal
depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent that is also at least a 10 percent
increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before. For countries that
meet the criteria for several continuous years, they use the first year of each 5-year
window to identify the crisis. This methodology identifies 236 currency crises over
the period. The figure indicates that currency crises are a common phenomenon,
averaging more than five per year since 1975, with relative peaks in the early
1980s, the early 1990s and in 1998 at the time of the The 3-year period,2005-07
appears to be a period of relative tranquility. However, the global financial crisis
in 2008-09 caused widespread financial market turmoil. Twenty-three countries
experienced exchange rate depreciations of 25 percent or more during the 9-month
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Figure 5: Currency crises episodes from 1979
Database Laeven and Valencia (2017)
period between August 2008 and February 2009, many of which would satisfy the
formal definition of currency crisis used above. Their incidence increased in 2015
due to the large currency depreciations in many commodity-exporter countries
triggered by a decline in commodity prices (Kohlscheen et al., 2016).
To better identify a crisis sequencing pattern, Laeven and Valencia show in
Figure 6 the incidence of currency and sovereign debt crises along a time scale (in
years) in countries that experienced a banking crisis in year T. A clearer pattern
now emerges. Currency and sovereign debt crises, on average, tend to coincide or
follow banking crises, with currency crises peaking at one year after the beginning
of the banking crisis; it is common for banking crises to happen at the same time
or precede currency and sovereign debt crises. The 1990s was the peak period of
twin crises, abstracting from the 2008-09 global financial crisis for which complete
data on banking crises are not yet available.
Figure 7 compares the association of currency crises and the cessation of net
capital inflows, using results from a study by Hutchison and Noy (2006) of sudden
stops in 24 emerging market economies over the period 1975-2002. It shows that
currency crises coincide with sudden stops roughly half of the time. Of the 60
currency crises identified in emerging markets during this period, 34 coincided with
a sudden stop and 26 did not. On the other hand, there are many more instances
of sudden stops that do not coincide with currency crises. Of the 119 sudden stops,
85 did not coincide with a currency crisis (Hutchinson and Noy,2011)1.
1In Figure 7 numbers in parentheses express these numbers as a percent of available country-
year observations
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Figure 6: Crises sequence
Taken from Laeven and Valencia (2017)
Figure 7: Correlation currency crises and sudden stop
Taken from Hutchinson and Noy (2011)
4.3 Currency crises outcome on economic activity
There are several ways in which a currency crisis may affect economic activity. On
the one hand, a depreciation of the domestic currency that occurs in a successful
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currency attack, may expand the tradable goods sector and spur growth by cor-
recting an overvalued currency or by making the exchange rate more competitive.
On the other hand, a depreciation may be contractionary by increasing the re-
payment costs of external debts denominated in foreign currencies, particularly in
dollars. In addition, sudden stops or the reversal of capital inflows during a crisis
can slow down growth by lowering investment activity, while a rise in the external
debt burden from devaluation in the presence of liability valued in dollars can lower
investment activity and growth. The mainstream, until currency crises episodes
during the 1990s view was that any negative effects from a currency depreciation
were ultimately offset by the positive effect of stimulus to net exports, leading to
an the overall expansionary effect of a depreciation on output. However, recent
literature emphasizes the contractionary effects of depreciations, particularly in
developing countries.
Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2003),find that more than three-fifths of the crises
in the sample were contractionary, and that output contraction was more likely
greater in large and more developing economies than in small and less developing
economies, and crises in countries preceded by large capital inflows were more likely
to be associated with contraction during crises. Hutchison and Noy (2005, 2006)
investigate the output effects of currency and banking crises in emerging markets
during 1975-97 and find that currency crises are very costly, reducing output by
about 5 to–8 percent over a 2 to4 year period. They also show that currency crises
accompanied by sudden stops have especially severe economic consequences, as
the abrupt reversal in foreign credit inflows in conjunction with a realignment of




There is now a rich body of evidence showing that credit growth predicts crises
where credit growth is typically defined as the previous three years or five years of
cumulative growth. There is no consensus in the literature about the definition of
a “credit boom.” A credit boom is defined in general as an episode in which credit
to the private sector grows by more than during a typical business cycle expansion
and often are associated to period of economic turbulence.
But,what triggers a lending booms? There are various leading theories that
could be divided into four categories: real business cycle(a), financial development
and liberalization(b), capital inflows(c) and wealth shocks(d).
a) A lending boom is a by-product of a large real business cycle in which the
output-elasticity of the demand for credit is highly procyclical. The ultimate origin
of a boom under this story is a technological or terms of trade shock (Mendoza,
1995). Investment boom that arises with lending boom is a typical outcome in
this type of model. This story also explains why the incidence of banking and
balance-of-payment crises after a lending boom is not larger than during tranquil
times.
b) This theory holds that a lending boom is the natural outcome of a sig-
nificant liberalization of an initially repressed financial system. If a country has
interest rate caps, lending that is centrally allocated, and an over-regulated bank-
ing industry, then the credit-to-GDP ratio is considerably lower than in a country
without any of these regulations. The lending boom following a financial liber-
alization might become large and troublesome if domestic real interest rate rise
very significantly (Galbis,1993) and there is a higher probability of both bank-
ing and balance-of-payment crisis (Kaminski and Reinhart, 1999). Moreover, the
liberalization my trigger an investment ( and consumption) boom which, in turn,
causes external disequilibrium such as real exchange rate overvaluation and a large
current account deficit. Larger capital inflows and debt concentration in short ma-
turities may also follow a liberalization, especially when this involves opening the
capital account.
An alternative theory (Aghion et al., 1999)argues that lending booms and sub-
sequent macroeconomic instability may be the consequence of partial financial
liberalization, in economies that exhibit some financial constraints. Financial lib-
eralization increases capital inflows. Initially, this increases output and wealth
of investors. Since personal wealth can be pledged as collateral on domestic in-
vestment projects, this increases further the demand for credit. In the models
to identify credit booms, increases in wealth and output, lead to a surge in the
demand for non-traded inputs into production( such as real estate). The result is
real appreciation of the real exchange rate and a surge in the price of domestic
assets. This eventually chokes off the initial expansion and lead to a decline in
26
output. As the economy contracts, demand for nontradable input falls leading to
a real depreciation and a collapse in asset prices. Aghion et al. (1999) show that
the resulting volatility occurs for intermediate levels of financial development as
measured by the severity of the financing constraint. In their theory, incomplete
financial liberalization may leave a country expoed to financial and macroeconomic
instability. This theory makes a number of predictions about the chain of events
leading to a crisis. large capital inflows and current account deficit, real exchange
rate appreciation and output expansion coincide with the increase in investment
and lending.
c) A lending boom is the domestic counterpart of large capital inflow surge
triggered by so-called external factors (Calvo,Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993).
Episodes occur in waves because of common external fundamentals. International
real interest rate are rather low during the lending upswing. There is a bunching
of epsodes because of common external fundamentals. The banking system in-
termediates the funds by increasing credit to the private sector which raises both
consumption and investment.
d) A lending boom occurs when a large investment or consumption expansion
needs financing. New discoveies of natural resources, a large exogenous change in
relative prices, or relevant structural reforms may triggered this expansion. This
theory predict higher growth and macroeconomic stability.
5.1 Methodology to classify credit boom
There is now a rich body of evidence showing that credit growth predicts crises
where credit growth is typically defined as the previous three years or five years
of cumulative growth. A lot of authors are interested in the relationship between
credit booms and crises. Gourinchas et al. (2001) “define a lending boom episode
as a deviation of the ratio between nominal private credit and nominal GDP from
a rolling, backward-looking, country-specific stochastic trend”. They require that
the deviation be larger than a given threshold. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) use
real credit per capita and detrend with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Richter et al.
(2017) also use a version of the Hodrick-Prescott filter that is based on Hamilton
(2018). Hodrick and Prescott analyzed U.S. data over a period during which there
was no financial crisis in the United States. Separating the growth component from
the deviation led to the view that the growth component is driven by technological
change, while deviations are due to technological “shocks”. Prescott (1986) argues
that technology shocks (measured by Total Factor of Productivity) are highly
procyclical and “account for more than half the fluctuations in the postwar period.”
Financial crises pose challenges for macroeconomists. Schularick and Taylor (2012)
show that credit booms precede crises. Mendoza and Terrones (2008) claim that
not all credit booms end in crises. Herrera et al. (2014) argue that crises are not
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necessarily the result of large negative shocks, but also of political considerations.
There is a need for models displaying financial crises that are preceded by credit
booms and that are not necessarily the result of large negative shocks.
Figure 8: Credit boom definition
Taken from Gourinchas,Valdes and Landerretche(2001)
Gourinchas,Valdes and Landerretche(2001) as cited above they require that the
trend has to be larger than a certain threshold. They thought that is the correct
approach because some increases in lending may lead to permanent financial deep-
ening while others lead to reversals. They consider two threshold definitions: rela-
tive deviation and absolute deviation. The first is based on the relative difference
between predict and real credit-to-GDP ratio, implying that different countries
may experience different lending boom independently on their financial deepen-
ings. The second is based on the absolute difference between predict and real
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credit-to-GDP ratio, implying that more financial developed countries experience
easily lending boom.
Mendoza and Terrones (2008)proposed a new methodology for measuring and
identifying credit booms and showed that it was successful at identifying credit
booms with a clear cyclical pattern in both macro and micro data. It is called
”threshold method”. They use this method which works by first splitting real
credit per capita in each country into its cyclical and trend components, and then
identifying a credit boom as an episode in which credit exceeds its long-run trend
by more than a given “boom” threshold, defined in terms of a tail probability event.
The duration of the boom is similarly set by “starting” and “ending” thresholds.
The long-run trend is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the
smoothing parameter set at 100, as is typical for annual data. Country i is defined
to have experienced a credit boom when we identify one or more contiguous dates
for which the credit boom condition li,t≥ φσ(li) holds, where σ is the boom
threshold factor. Thus, during a credit boom the deviations from trend in credit
exceed the typical expansion of credit over the business cycle by a factor of φ or
more. The baseline value of φ is set at 1.65, because the 5 percent tail of the
standardized normal distribution satisfies Prob(li,t ) /σ(li)=1.65) = 0.05.
Schularick and Taylor(2012) pursue an event-analysis approach to study the
co-evolution of money and credit aggregates and real economic activity in the
five year window following a financial crisis event, using a set of event definitions
based on documentary descriptions in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). They develop
the analysis in two periods (1870-1939;1945-2009) because these two periods reflect
very different monetary and regulatory framework after WW2, namely the shift
away from gold to fiat money,and the expanded role of the Lender of Last Re-
sort.The two core definitions of their work are: total lending or bank loans which
is defined as the end-of-year amount of outstanding domestic currency lending by
domestic banks to domestic households and non-financial corporations and total
bank assets which is defined as the year-end sum of all balance sheet assets of
banks with national residency (excluding foreign currency assets).
Gorton and Ordoñez (2016 and 2020) propose a definition of a “credit boom”
that is very simple with regard to trends. They detrend implicitly using the ratio
of credit to the private sector divided by GDP. This means that credit has to grow
faster than GDP to possibly be part of a credit boom. They define a credit boom
as starting whenever a country experiences three consecutive years of positive
credit growth (as a fraction of GDP) that average more than xs. The boom ends
whenever a country experiences at least two years of credit growth (also es as
a fraction of GDP) not higher than x . In our baseline experiments we choose
xe = 5% and xe = 0%. They choose this thresholds based on the average credit
growth in the sample.
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Richter, Schularick and Wachtel (2018) their criteria for credit booms is based
on detrended real private credit per capita, where the credit data come from Schu-
larick and Taylor (2012). To detrend the data they follow Hamilton (2018) who
shows that the use of a HP filter introduces spurious dynamic relations into the
data that have no basis in the underlying data generating process.The procedure
is based on the assumption that the trend component of credit at time t is the
value we could have predicted based on historical data. In particular let h denote
the horizon for which we build such a prediction, then the cyclical component is
the difference between the realized value at time t and the expectation about the
value at time t formed at time t − h based on the data available at that time.
Hamilton proposes that this residual should be based on a regression of the value
y at time t on four most recent values of y at time t− h. Formally, this regression
can be written as:
yt = β0 + β1yt−h + β2yt−h−1 + β3yt−h−2 + β4yt−h−3 + vt (1)
They choose a horizon of 3 years, so the residual is the deviation of the real-
ized value yt from the expectation formed at time t − 3 based on information on
yt−3, yt−4, yt−5 and yt−6. They define that a credit boom episode occurs when real
credit per capita exceeds expectations by more than a specific amount and it is
based in terms of the country specific standard deviation of the detrended credit
variable as in Mendoza and Terrones.
5.2 Data
Gourinchas,Valdes and Landerretche(2001) used a sample of ninety-one country
over the period 1960-1996. All the countries have more than 500,000 inhabitants
and more than twelve year of credit data available from the International Financial
Statistics. They measure private credit as claims on the non-banking private sector
from banking institutions. Credit correspond to a stock variable so they consider
the geometric average of GDP in two consecutive years as the relevant measures of
GDP in the ratio calculations and the they estimate the trend of credit to credit-to-
GDP using the HP filter. They observe with a relative high threshold a significant
number of episodes (23 with relative deviation and 33 with absolute deviation).
They computed the duration of a credit boom which on average fluctuates between
5.5 years and 6.5 years with build-up phase which takes almost 2.5 years.
They find that the number of countries experiencing a lending boom varies
under the two criteria: under the relative criterion emerge two peaks the early
1980s and the mid 1990s; under absolute criterion there is a natural upward trend
in the number of cases, due to financial deepening, with a peak beetween 1991 and
1993.
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Figure 9: Frequency of credit booms (from 1970 to 2010
From Mendoza and Terrones (2012)
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) use data on credit from the financial sector to
the private non-financial sector obtained from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics for a sample of 61 countries, 21 industrial and 40 emerging economies
for the 1960-2010 period. The measure of credit is the sum of claims on the
private sector by deposit money banks plus, whenever available for the entire
sample period for a given country, claims on the private sector by other financial
institutions. Real credit per capita is calculated as the end-of-year observations
of nominal credit per capita deflated by their corresponding end-of-year consumer
price index. They identified 70 credit booms in data, 35 in ICs and 35 in EMs
(Figure 9.
As shown in Figure 10, at the peak of the booms, the average expansion in
real credit per capita reached about 30 percent above trend in EMs, twice what is
observed in ICs. Normalized by the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of credit in each country, however, credit booms in the two groups of countries show
a similar distribution, with medians of 2 and 2.1 for ICs and EMs respectively.
The results based on medians indicate that EMs and ICs show booms with
similar duration of about 3-6 years results very similars compared with Gourinchas
et al.(2001), and the fraction of the boom spent in the upswing and downswing
phases is about the same. Using means, however, EMs seem to show longer and
31
more asymmetric booms. Credit booms tend to be clustered geographically and
not limited to a single region: 40 percent of the booms experienced by emerging
economies were observed in East Asia and 32 percent in Latin America. Likewise,
33 percent of the credit booms in industrial countries were observed in the G7
and 18 percent in the Nordic countries. Credit booms tend to be synchronized
internationally and centered around big events.
Figure 10: Deviation in real credit pro-capita
From Mendoza and Terrones (2012)
Gorton and Ordoñez (2016 and 2020) from the dataset of Laeven and Valencia
(2013) find 87 booms by their definition. Once they have identified these credit
booms, they start classifying them between bad or good depending on whether
they are accompanied by a financial crisis in a neighborhood of three years of the
end of the boom, or not, respectively. In their sample there are 47 crises identified
by Laeven and Valencia (2013). Table 2 taken from their work in 2016. shows that
34 of those crises happened at the end of one of the 87 booms identified (hence 34
bad booms are in the sample). There were eight crises that did not occur at the
end of a boom (but occurred during a boom), and there were five crises that were
not associated with any boom. So, there are good booms and bad booms, but also
crises unrelated to the end of booms, or with no booms at all.
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Number of crises occurring at the end of a boom 34
Number of crises occurring not at the end of a boom 8
Number of crises not associated with booms 5
Total number of crises in the sample 47
Table 2: Credit Booms
Gorton and Ordoñez(2020)
5.3 Characteristics of credit booms. Are they good or
bad?
Credit booms are often cited as the culprit behind financial crises, particularly
in emerging economies (Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002). If this is the case, credit
booms should be closely associated with financial crises.
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) construct a seven-year event windows of the
cyclical components of macro aggregates centered on the peak of credit booms.
The windows show the cross-country means and medians of output (Y), private
consumption (C), public consumption (G), investment (I), the output of nontrad-
ables (YN), the real exchange rate (RER), the current account-output ratio (CAY)
and total capital inflows as share of output (KI). Except for RER in the EMs group,
there is little difference in the dynamics produced by country means and medians,
indicating that the results are not driven by outliers. For EMs Y, C and G rise
2 to 5 percentage points above trend in the build up phase of the credit boom,
and drop to between 2 to 3.5 percent below trend in the recessive phase. I, YN
and RER follow a similar pattern but display significantly larger expansions and
recessions. Investment rises up to about 20 percent above trend at the peak of
credit booms and then drops. Only current account ratio and capital inflows follow
the opposite pattern.
Also the ICs shows several similarities with those for emerging economies but
the amplitude of these fluctuations is smaller. They then studied the behavior of
inflation, equity prices and housing prices during credit booms finding that credit
booms are usually not associated with sharp changes in inflation. In contrast,
housing and equity prices show a clear pattern of rising prices in the upswing and
declining prices in the downswing. These movements in asset prices are important
because they are consistent with theoretical explanations of credit booms and busts
that rely on financial accelerators and balance sheet effects.
A similar work was made by Gourinchas et al.(2001), to investigate the origins
of a lending boom and to evaluate its macroeconomic impact; instead of using only
7 macroeconomic indicators they used 14 indicators that can be grouped in four
categories : domestic macroeconomic variable, domestic policy, international vari-
able and external factors. The trend of those indicators is similar of those obtained
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by Mendoza and Terrones in their work 10 years later. Output gap, investment,
consumption (that are included in the domestic macroeconomic variables) follows
the same pattern increasing in the build-up phase in a level higher than during
a tranquil periods and declines after the peak. Also the patterns of International
variables (current account to GDP,real exchange rate, private capital inflows)are
in line with findings of Mendoza and Terrones(2012).
Richter, Schularick and Wachtel (2018) defined a ”bad” boom those booms
that end in a banking crisis. The Jorda‘-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database
provides for the first time extensive historical information on a wide variety of
characteristics. These characteristics fall into four broad categories:
1. The first set of variables are characteristics of the detrended credit vari-
able, such as duration of the credit boom and the deviation from trend
(Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016));
2. The second set of variables are real economic fundamentals including GDP,
consumption, investment, the current account balance and interest rates,
where the literature suggests that we should expect a deteoriating current
account balance to be associated with a higher risk of banking crisis;
3. The third set of variables relates to the financial sector itself. Here, the risk of
a banking crisis might be related to the financing of credit on the liability side
(capital-to-asset ratio and wholesale funding), aggregate illiquidity measures
such as the loan-to-deposit ratio and the size of the financial sector;
4. A last set of variables refers to asset prices, especially in stock and housing
markets.
They use Hamilton procedure for each country time series and they normalized by
the country specific standard deviation to account for different volatilities across
countries. To compare boom observations, we use the value of each variable one
period before the peak of the boom in order to capture vulnerabilities before the
boom collapses.
They also examined the mean characteristics of the booms during the 1950s
and 1960s, a period in which there were 31 credit booms in our sample countries,
all of which were good.
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) create a table ( similar to Table 3 about the per-
centage of banking crises, currency crises and Sudden Stops that occurred during
the seven-year window of the credit boom events in EMs, ICs and all countries
combined. The percent of crises that occurred before, at, and after the peak of




All countries 0.44 0.54 0.24
Industrial countries 0.36 0.44 0.14
Emerging market economies 0.51 0.63 0.34
Table 3: Percentage of booms turned into a crises
From Mendoza and Terrones (2012)
in both EMs and ICs are often associated with currency crises, banking crises,
and Sudden Stops, although the first two are observed more often than the third.
Banking crises are observed in 44 percent of all credit booms, 1/3rd of IC credit
booms and 1/2 of EM credit booms. Currency crises are observed in 54 percent of
all credit booms, in 44 percent of IC credit booms and 2/3rds of EM credit booms.
Sudden Stops are observed in about 1/4 of all credit booms, in 14 percent of IC
credit booms and 1/3rd of EM credit booms. Thus, clearly not all credit booms
end in crisis, but odds are about 1 out of 4 that once a country enters a credit
boom it will end with a currency or a banking crisis, and a little less that it will
end in a sudden Stop. These findings are broadly consistent with those reported
in Schularick and Taylor (2012). They examined whether credit growth is a signif-
icant predictor of banking crises for a sample of fourteen developed countries over
the 1870 to 2008 period, and found that indeed credit growth helps predict these
crises.
Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) create a table which present a summary statistics
of a number of variables over different periods, which include total credit as a
fraction of GDP, credit to households and to the corporate sector, TFP, patents,
real GDP, investment, and labor productivity. The table also provides an overview
of booms periods compared to non-boom periods and it compares booms that end
with a crisis with booms that did not end in crises.
Comparing boom periods to non-boom periods what stands out is that all
measures of credit (the first four rows) are significantly larger during booms. The
average change in capital expenditures (the variable “INV growth”) is significantly
higher during booms compared to non-booms, consistent with investment booms
coinciding with credit booms. Real GDP growth (rGDP) is also higher during
booms as is credit both to the corporate sector and to households.
At the onset of credit booms TFP grows at 1.5% compared to an average of
1% in the previous three years for good booms and 1% versus an average of 0.2%
for bad booms. A similar path is followed by the LP which remain lower in bad
booms with respect of good booms.
Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) create a model to estimate the type of a credit
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Booms Booms
Whole Non with without
sample booms Booms a crisis a crisis
Avg. credit growth % 3.83 -2.41 8.96 9.84 8.30
Avg. total Cr’d growth % 8.09 1.59 13.43 13.95 13.03
Avg. TFP growth % 0.83 0.78 0.87 0.47 1.17
Avg. Pt Gnt’d growth % 3.87 3.72 3.99 2.33 5.48
Avg. rGDP growth % 2.56 2.29 2.78 2.40 3.07
Avg. LP growth % 2.52 2.45 2.57 2.06 2.96
Avg. duration (years) 10.68 11.76 9.98
Number of booms 87 34 53
Sample size (years) 1695 776 929 400 529
Table 4: Caption
boom based on changes of TFP and LP
Pr(BadBoomsj,t|Boomsj,t) = FL(α + β∆Xj,t) (2)
They find that If the change in TFP, for example, is on average declining over
the boom, then the coefficient on the prediction of bad booms should be negative,
that is, a positive change in TFP is making the boom less likely to be a bad boom;
conditional on being in a boom, an increase of one standard deviation in TFP
reduces the probability of being in a bad boom (a boom that will end in a crisis)
by 6%.
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6 The case of Turkey
6.1 Recent economic Turkish history
The term ‘financialisation’ was coined in the early 1990s; the first to use this
term were Arrighi (1994) and Phillips (1994) and has since been interpreted in
varying ways, resulting in different research strands across a range of academic
disciplines, including economics, sociology and geography. Initially, researches
about financialisation centred on the US economy. The working definition of the
phenomenon used by many economists is Epstein’s (2005) broad understanding
of financialisation as ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets,
financial actors and financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and in-
ternational economies’. This broad definition means that different interpretations
of the phenomenon exist at the same time.
Karwowski and Stockhammer (2017) identify six interpretations:
1. financial deregulation and the integration of EMEs into the global financial
system drives financialisation in these countries;
2. foreign financial inflows result in financialisation in EMEs;
3. Financial liberalisation encourages asset price inflation in EMEs, which is an
important aspect of financialisation;
4. The shift from a bank-based to a market-based financial system causes fi-
nancialisation in EMEs;
5. Debt levels among businesses in EMEs have been seen with concern as sign
of financialisation;
6. The increased involvement of households in finance, e.g. strongly rising in-
debtedness of individuals, characterises household financialisation.
In the 1970s, the rather inward-looking development models of the Mediter-
ranean countries (e.g. Spain and Egypt) entered into crisis. Economically, the
crisis was particularly acute in Turkey. The country faced serious balance of pay-
ments problems. Due to the dearth of foreign exchange, bottlenecks emerged
for some key commodities, particularly energy. At the same time, trade union
militancy and political conflicts increased. With the so-called 24 January mea-
sures, the Turkish government adopted a very tough liberalisation and austerity
program, which was backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank in 1980 (Becker,2016). This program signalled the abandonment of
the import substitution model of 1980 and the switch towards new-liberal policies.
In the years after 1980, three predominant traits of accumulation can be identified:
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1. Export-orientation (1980-1988);
2. State-centred financialisation (1989-2001)
3. Mass-credit-based financialisation (since 2002)
6.1.1 Export-oriented accumulation
The 24 January programme signalled the switch towards an export-oriented strat-
egy, which was to last until 1988 (Becker,2016). The export promotion strategy
was essentially based on low wages. While the trade unions were ruthlessly re-
pressed and labour legislation amended in favour of capital, real wages declined by
40% between 1980 and 1988 (Becker,2016). Turkey was already known for its ex-
port in agricultural products. However due to low international terms of trade for
agriculture products, it was not possible to increase the current account numbers.
New sectors had to replace agriculture so industrial products and service sectors
were used in exports. There were loads of unused capacities in the industry and
new external loans which led to export of products. Exports were additionally
promoted by the devaluation of the Turkish lira and specific export support mea-
sures. Indeed, exports increased from 2.3 bn to 11.7 bn US$ between 1980 and
1988. The export profile displayed a clear trend of de-primarisation. The share
of industrial goods in exports increased from 36.8% to 80% (Becker,2016). The
average current account deficit amounted to a relatively moderate 1.4% of GDP
between 1980 and 1988 (Becker,2016) (Figure 11). This could be described as
the primal period of financialisation in Turkey due to creation of Capital Market
Council. The severe debt crisis of the periphery put a massive brake on capital
flows to the periphery in the 1980s, due to an increasing of the interest rate because
banks were racing to collect deposits. Many small companies were unable to repay
the loans they got and became insolvents, government financed these small firms
who were in jeopardy; what came out from this situation was a disaster, many
banks were bankrupting. This was a structural impediment to financialisation in
Turkey in those years. Internal and external loans started the decade at a value
around the 12% and ended the decade (1988) at a level of almost 90%.
Since this liberalization ended up in failure, deposits and interests rates were
regulated by the Ministry of Finance and later the Central Bank of Turkey. It was
only with the restructuring and securitisation of Third World debts, which was set
into motion by the Brady Plan, that capital again started to flow massively into
the periphery from 1989 onwards (Becker,2016).
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Figure 11: GDP growth %
Data: https://data.worldbank.org/
6.1.2 State-centred financialisation
1989 was the year that marks the beginning of financialisation as the defining trait
of the Turkish accumulation model. The financialisation period can be sub-divided
into two sub-periods. The first one stretches from 1989 to 2001 and was based
particularly strongly on the state debt. A rapidly increasing private household
debt is a key feature of the second period. Both periods have a common massive
reliance on capital inflows (Becker,2016). Thus, Turkish financialisation can be
characterised as a ‘dependent financialisation’.
By the mid-1980s import quotas were mostly removed, customs tariffs were
reduced, and generous incentives were offered to exporters. Trade liberalization
was followed by the liberalization of the capital account and the convertibility of
the Turkish Lira (TL) in 1989. Foreign exchange controls on capital outflows were
removed, and both the current and capital accounts were completely liberalized.
Capital account liberalization was concomitant to domestic financial market lib-
eralization. Interest rate controls were abandoned in the 1980s and Istanbul stock
exchange Market was established in 1986. The weight of public sector in financial
markets gradually decreased.
Turkish financialisation started at a difficult juncture for the right-wing gov-
ernment in Turkey. In the late 1980s, workers pressed vehemently for higher wages
and forced concessions on government and capital. It was no longer possible to
deal with the balance of payments problem by export promotion based on wage
repression. The way out was to be the promotion of capital imports. In 1989,
Turkey radically liberalised external capital flows (Becker,2016). As the 1980s was
a “lost decade” for many countries in Latin America the 1990s had qualified as
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a lost decade for Turkey as its economy was in deep recession by the mid-1990s
ensuing the 1994 economic crisis (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Boratav and Yeldan,
2006).Turkey offered high interest rates in order to attract foreign capital. Turk-
ish banks, which used to be part of diversified economic groups, lent the money
at even higher interest rates to the state. The state was the principal borrower
under Özal government.The high interest rates were a key driver for the exploding
credit needs of the state. In 1999, interest payments on the domestic debt alone
swallowed 35.1% of total state expenditure.
Since the liberalization of 1980s, Turkish economy has aspired to achieve an
export-driven growth. However, even though the volume of trade has raised signifi-
cantly, the contribution of net exports to growth has remained below zero. Imports
grew more rapidly than exports, and the average current account deficit reached
0.5% of the GDP between 1989 and 2001 – albeit with significant fluctuations
(Becker,2016). Continuous current account deficits have meant accumulation of
liabilities which should be sooner or later paid back. Unless the current account
balance is not improved, debt servicing capacity of developing countries would be
vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals in financial flows.
Figure 12: Current account % GDP
Data: https://data.worldbank.org/
The financialised accumulation model was highly dependent on capital inflows
and highly volatile. Increasing dollarisation was a key factor for increasing the
vulnerability to crisis. This trend could be ascribed to two factors. On the one
hand, the high rate of inflation diminished the trust in the national currency.This
was an incentive for arbitrage business – for example banks providing high interest
TL credits to the state which were refinanced by cheaper international loans. The
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high degree of dollarisation was one of the main factors behind the policies of a
‘strong’ Turkish lira. Increase in import demand is inevitable when high appreci-
ated foreign exchange rate and liberalized import is present. The Turkish people
started to buy cheap foreign products. Such increase in demand also increases
foreign currency demand and foreign currency outflow. Measures released by the
IMF stability program in 1989 were ignored by Turkey between 1989 and early
1993. Inflation was high (almost 60%) while the foreign exchange rate was stable
at a level of 45%-50%. The result of these two components was an highly ap-
preciation of Turkish Lira. Current deficits and public sector deficits had to be
financed externally. Internal and external debt stocks were increased. The effect
of the cumulative troubles showed the first signs at the beginning of 1994. Foreign
exchange started to get appreciated heavily. Credit ratings were downgraded so
people started to demand more foreign currency. The inflation as response surged
at level of 115% 2. Government decided to lower interest rate that were hanging
public budget. The 1994 started from this background. The causes of the crises
could be summarised (Durgut,2002) :
1. Public sector borrowing requirements (PBSR) ratio increased on a sustained
basis until it hit a record of 15.2% in 1993 leading to a continuous deteri-
oration of macroeconomic fundamentals in the Turkish economy during the
pre-crisis period, increasing price level and Turkish lira was devaluated;
2. The current account deficit was raising to fast. Capital account liberalization
was implemented to it but the government did not apply any structural
reforms to dampen any oncoming instability in the future;
3. High domestic interest rates enabled Turkey to attract capital inflows. Fi-
nancing of the public debt through short-term capital inflows, however, raises
another problem that domestic debt financing is not sustainable when real
interest rates surpass the real economic growth rate
The 1994 economic crisis significantly affected the Turkish economy; in the after-
math of the crisis, the Turkish economy one of the highest output losses. The
economy contracted by 6%. Between January and April 1994; for example, the
Turkish Lira depreciated by more than 60% against the United States Dollar. Level
of inflation was extremely high and also the interest rates were. Reserves halved,
dropping from $7 Millions to $3 Millions in April to curb depreciation in the Turk-
ish Lira. The high depreciation ratio of the Turkish Lira significantly contributed
to the output loss in the Turkish economy by causing bankruptcies among busi-
nesses. Businesses that had foreign-currency denominated loans could not afford
their payments and went bankrupt, causing a drastic decrease in national output
2CBRT data
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and increasing unemployment. The unemployment rate increased from 11.2% in
the first half of 1993 to 12.6% during the same period in 1994 (Durgut,2002). In-
ternational agencies began downgrading Turkey’s credit rating. The moved from
BBB in May 1992 to a B+ in August 1994 (Standard & Poor’s).3
Figure 13: Inflation rate (annual change on CPI)
Data: https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/inflation-cpi
The government responded to the 1994 economic crisis by announcing a sta-
bilization program on April 5, 1994 which main objectives were facing high in-
flation, high external debt, unsustainable public-sector budget deficits, and bal-
ance of payments crisis. The main measures of the April 5 stabilization program
were(Durgut,2002):
1. devaluation of 39% of Turkish Lira;
2. abolition of the 5% tax on the revenues earned in the government securities
market;
3. one-time tax surcharge on private enterprises
4. Liberalization of the exchange rate determination. With the new system,the
exchange rates would be determined according to the data provided by 10
major commercial banks along with the Central Bank
3data from https://www.theglobaleconomy.com
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5. increase in public sector prices (tobacco,sugar, liquor, tea and fuel)
6. reduction in public expenditure
7. privatization of some important enterprises
8. increase of interest rate
In the short term stability achieved its short-term goals, such as stabilizing the
financial markets and the Turkish Lira; however, it failed to achieve its long-term
goals of reducing the public deficit and high inflation on a permanent basis while
did not reach long-term goals such as privatization, social security, and structural
reforms. All this led IMF in 2000 to sign an agreement with Turkish government
(the IMF-backed stabilisation program) which was similar to agreements signed
by IMF in Latin America in 1970s and early 1990s.
This policy penalised exporting companies and stimulated imports with the
consequence of a deteriorating current account. Maintaining growth and the ex-
change rate was highly dependent on attracting capital inflows.
6.1.3 Mass-credit-based financialisation
Turkey experienced the worst macroeconomic crisis of the post-World War II pe-
riod in 2000 and 2001. During the crisis the output contracted at a rate of -5.7
percent. Nevertheless, this contraction was expected prior to the crisis since the
Turkish economy had given the signs of fragilities and vulnerabilities throughout
the 1990s. It was marked by one major crisis erupted in 1994, political instability
(consecutive short-lived coalition governments), increase of the level of public debt
to an unprecedented level, increasing real interest rates and social distress. The
average growth rate of the 1980s was 5.2 percent while it was 3.0 percent for the
1990s.
The high government debt stock and debt servicing has put enormous bur-
den on government budget and forced the government to cut its expenditures
significantly from time to time. Permanent instability led to successive IMF ‘sta-
bilisation’ programs in particular the 1998 IMF agreement to reduce government
debt. In addiction Turkey government announces a stabilization program which
main policies (Memorandum Turkey, 1998) : an increase in the primary surplus
of the budget; a shift in the management of key variables such as public sector
wages; a supportive and closely coordinated monetary policy; structural reforms
to ensure the progressive strengthening of public finances; stepped up privatiza-
tion to lower the domestic borrowing requirement. The program became effective
from December 1999. Meanwhile, IMF agreement aim was to introduce reforms
in three major policies fiscal, monetary and structural. From the point of fiscal
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reform the aim was to reduce the debt through privatization proceeds and limiting
expenditures. Main action in monetary policy was to implement a monetary and
exchange rate policy consistent with reducing inflation to 50 percent by end-1998
and 20 percent by end-1999 (Memorandum Turkey, 1998). Structural policies re-
gard lot of sector in particular petroleum prices and retirement age. The currency
kept appreciating in real terms but it lead to currency flight. There was an outflow
of US $ 5.3 billion (Orhangazi and Dufour, 2007). The sudden and rapid outflows
of capital led the economy to crumble. The financialised accumulation model was
highly dependent on capital inflows and highly volatile. Increasing dollarisation
was a key factor for increasing the vulnerability to crisis and during this period
caused an uncontrollably fluctuation of foreign exchange reserves.
Figure 14: Overnight interest rate (Q1-1995 Q1-2002
Database Fed of St. Louis
Policymakers tried to maintain a managed exchange rate regime during the
turmoil. This cause an increase in money supply hence a devaluation of TL, this
also led to the abandonment of the pegged exchange regime. Debt to GDP nearly
doubled, inflation was on the rise, and interest rates were high as ever and more.
IMF program aim was not reached. In addiction of an high level of external debt
which raise from $72 billions in 1995 to over $ 110 billions in 2001 also internal
debt increase from 14% to over 45% 4.
There were other fragilities: a high level of corruption (Turkey was ranked
4CBRT data
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at the 50th place in the corruption perception index); a poor governance and
a blemish banking sector. Regarding the poor government is exemplifying the
fact that government expenditures have swelled rapidly between 1990-2000 from
expenses incurred out of extra-budgetary funds and revolving funds. There was
malpractice with the government’s money. Governments were spending on their
own without accounting to the Parliament, according to (Koch and Chaudhary,
2001), government spent around $16 billion from an unknown source out of the
budget without accounting it to the Parliament in 2000.
Meanwhile financial was following in a dangerous way. Both private and public
banks were suffering from insolvency. Banks were purchasing foreign currencies
from the open market to pay the loans when the foreign creditors called their loans
back during the crisis. The result was that domestic currency reserves reduced and
pressure increased on exchange rates.
All those factor led to the crisis. The crisis did indeed affect the economy in
many sectors. During 2000-2001 was a nightmare for workers and labors. Main rea-
son was the taxation system. Real wages and the labor share decreased markedly
after the crisis. The difficult post-crisis economic conditions, such as an unem-
ployment rate exceeded 10%. The government cut the wages of public employees
and froze the real wages of civil servants too. Such decisions and the rising unem-
ployment rate meant a disaster to the employment market. The organized labor
union was deteriorating and strikes were rising up which resulted with a major
wage concessions. Real wage facing even worse situation.
Government spent $47.2 billion to bail out the Turkish financial system, in-
cluding $25.3 billion to rescue private banks.
Debt repayment and interest charges were covered up by the domestic resources
because of the increase in foreign debt. Turkey was submerged by debts. When a
state is in an analog situation with international debt, IMF and other important
international creditors have advantage in making new economic policies. A state
with such deficiencies at debt level will be willing to do and accept any reforms to
repay the debt. Nonetheless, the IMF was satisfied with the governments act for
putting the governmental guarantee on private banks’ liabilities. Consequently,
these loans became risk free and the entire cost of the adjustment in domestic
financial markets was shifted to the domestic population. The only way interna-
tional capital could lose was through its direct investments and portfolio. The
events after the crisis had pros and cons. For domestic capitalists, they benefited
from policies forced on Turkey thanks to the leverage that international capital
held over the government. But restrictions on foreign investment were eased in
various sectors at a moment when domestic capital was not in a good position to
compete.
The new privatization strategy was projected and included the full privati-
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Figure 15: External debt from Q1-1995 to Q3-2001
Database CBRT
zation of Turk Telekom, sales of government monopolies in sugar, tobacco, and
gas sectors, Turkish Airlines, steel, petroleum refineries and lastly the privatiza-
tion of the companies responsible for the generation and distribution of electricity.
The other development was the establishment of an inflation targeting system and
the CBRT’s gaining independent status from the government and cutting direct
borrowing lines between the CBRT and the Treasury (Becker,2016). In addition
to the IMF program, the new financial reforms were anchored by Turkey’s offi-
cial European Union candidacy status. Consequently, capital inflows skyrocketed
during this period, which was mainly characterized by increasing household and
non-financial corporate debt.The diminishing public sector borrowing requirement
following the 2001 restructuring pushed Turkish banks to pursue new outlets for
profitable lending. Domestic mergers and acquisitions that produced sectoral con-
solidation and the internalization of foreign finance capital gave way to changes
in bank assets control and diversification of financial products attracting house-
holds(Becker,2016).
After the crisis, the TCMB started to implement floating exchange rate regime.
Although the year 2002 was the first year of floating exchange rate regime and it
was completely new and unknown for all market participants, the intervention was
quite rare and it was limited to extremely volatile movements that were not justi-
fiable through fundamentals including market sentiment. The TCMB announced
that it would intervene in the markets only in cases of excess volatility, without
affecting the long-run equilibrium level of the exchange rates(Görmez and Yilmaz,
2007). The predominance of state fictitious capital in the financial markets did
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Figure 16: Foreign direct investment from 2000 to 2009
Database CBRT
not end in the post-2001 years. On the contrary, declining interest rates between
2002 and 2005 enabled bondholders to benefit from holding such capital. Given
the primary surpluses of the state and a declining public sector borrowing require-
ment, the new focal point became the consumer credit market. This phase that
began after 2001 crisis, was characterized by the growth of household indebted-
ness, a new phenomenon in Turkey, even though the ratio of household debt to
disposable income was still lower than in most ACCs. Key elements of this pro-
gram, whose basic lines the AKP governments continued to follow after assuming
office in 2002, included the reorganisation of the banking sector and the creation of
independent regulation authorities as key components(Becker,2016). Turkish lira
as the world’s least valuable currency in 1995 and 1996, and again from 1999 to
2004. The Turkish lira had slid in value so far that one original gold lira coin could
be sold for almost 154 Millions of Turkish lira, so in December 2003 Turkish gov-
ernment passed a law hat allowed for redenomination by the removal of six zeros
from the Turkish lira, and the creation of a new currency which was introduced in
January 2005.
The second phase of mass-credit-based financialisation began after 2008 in-
ternational financial crisis and lasted until 2013. Since resolving the public debt
rollover in the post-2001 period did not satisfy ‘crowding out thesis’ proponents
by providing cheap and accessible resources to capital groups, securitization and
development of the corporate bond market became a hot topic in 2006-2007. Given
this background, reinforcing securitization and strengthening market (non-bank) fi-
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nance characterized the post-2008 medium-term government responses to Turkey’s
2008-2009 crisis. Thousands of Turkish firms, had to resort to bank finance as in
previous decades. In June 2009, amidst a year-long collapse of the Turkish economy
(4Q of 2008 to 4Q of 2009), the Council of Ministers made it easier for corpora-
tions without foreign exchange revenues to borrow in foreign currencies (Akcay,
Güngen; 2019). During the peak of financial crisis AKP governments implemented
policies that were attractive for foreign capital.
Firstly, relatively high interest rates which induced the inflow of money capital
though Turkish monetary policies have been more openly contentious and ambigu-
ous. However, the capital flows into Turkey were resumed relatively soon after the
peak of the crisis since international capital regarded the country as one of the
‘emerging markets’. The policies of almost zero interest rates and quantitative
easing of the core countries’ central banks made ‘emerging markets’ like Turkey
attractive destinations for financial placements(Becker,2016). As a direct result of
the policy responses to the Great Recession in the ACCs, it was becoming eas-
ier to obtain cheap USD loans. Following this step, non-financial corporate debt
increased from 66 billion USD to 177 billion USD between 2009 and 2013.
Secondly, massively accelerated privatisation attracted foreign direct invest-
ment. Banking has been one of the key sectors of FDI accounting, like manufac-
turing.The rapid increase in household debt has been a defining feature of the last
decade. Starting from a very low level of only 3.0% of GDP in 2003, household
debts increased to 19.6% of GDP in 2013 (Figure 17. Real wage growth was very
low (Becker,2016) and consumption credits contributed to sustaining or even in-
creasing consumption. Low income earners account for a very significant share of
consumption credits: in recent years, debtors with monthly incomes below 2000
TL incurred between 40% and 50% of all consumption credits (Becker, 2016).
The policy of the ‘strong’ Turkish lira, however, particularly favoured imports
whose price competitiveness was enhanced by the Turkish exchange rate policies.
Until 2011 and 2012, the current account deficits increased rapidly until they
reached almost 10% of GDP. On average, the current account deficit was 5.7%
of GDP between 2002 and 2012 (Becker,2016). This is clearly beyond the critical
level. While the average growth rate of 5.1% between 2002 and 2012 was relatively
high (higher than in the two earlier phases of neoliberalism in Turkey), economic
growth has slackened since 2013. The external capital inflow stimulus has con-
siderably weakened, which affects the growth motor – namely, debt-financed real
estate and consumption. Moreover, the structure of external debt has consistently
worsened over the last years. External shocks, especially those that cause a rise
in domestic inflation and capital reversals, have been harshly depressed by CBRT
mainly through monetary contractions and an upward trend in the TL. Other
examples of such episodes include(Caliskan and Karimova,2017):
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Figure 17: Increasing household debt in Turkey (2003-2013)
Database https://www.theglobaleconomy.com
1. Considerable rise in the overnight interest rate from 16.25% in April to
22.50% in July during 2006 , as a response to a hike (or an expectation
of it) in Japanese interest rates;
2. Monetary contraction in 2007 and 2008 in reaction to an increase in food
and energy prices (CBRT 2009);
3. Tightening in October 2011 due to rising domestic inflation caused by eco-
nomic crisis in the Eurozone;
In addiction, after the ACC central banks created massive amounts of money
via quantitative easing (QE) from 2009 onwards, these capital flows reversed to
boost the Turkish economy. Turkish policymakers did not take measures to pre-
vent a sharp increase in the non-financial sector’s foreign exchange debt. Despite
attempts by the CBRT and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)
to prevent rapid credit expansion and an explosion in household debt in 2010- 11,
there was no significant policy change. On the contrary, as capital market regula-
tions and state-level strategies to deepen the market based finance imply, the AKP
cadres hoped for a qualitative break in the near future, with significant increases
in private sector debt securities.
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6.2 Recent developments until currency crisis in 2018
Household indebtedness peaked in 2013 before declining due to increasing interest
rates resulting from adverse international financial conditions after the Fed’s taper-
ing announcement. That is, the dependent nature of ECC financialization became
apparent through the channel of higher borrowing costs when ACC interest rates
were increasing (Akcay and Gungen,2019). Despite the increasing indebtedness of
the corporate sector, crisis tendencies were evident in 2015, pushing large conglom-
erates to keep their short-term foreign exchange liabilities below their short-term
assets. The long-term liabilities of non-financial corporations exceeded their as-
sets by 190 billion USD in late 2015 and continued increasing until the abortive
coup attempt of 2016. Since the industrial structure is highly dependent on the
imported inputs, depreciation of the TL pushed inflation higher on the one hand
while not providing competitive advantages to the extent desired by large conglom-
erates on the other. Post-2016 Turkey therefore became more vulnerable to capital
flows. The share of portfolio flows in the financing of the current account deficit
increased further after the 2016 coup attempt, to reach 51 per cent in 2017. The
TL was losing ground faster than other emerging market currencies in 2017 while
both inflation and interest rates were much higher than in other middle-income
countries (Akcay and Gungen,2019).
Since 2013, Turkish economy faces a bottleneck, which paralysed the top level
AKP cadres and it is marked by three episode of crisis tendencies. Policymakers
successfully postponed the first two, but not the final one they use this strategy
of postponing crisis after intense political turmoil (five elections between 2013 and
2018). In the middle of a depreciation of national currency the main contradiction
of Turkish economy was that on one hand policymakers wanted to sustain a lower
interest rate policy even though international financial conditions were changing
while on the other hand, insisting on a lower interest rate policy for the sake of
strong economic growth triggered currency shocks.
This caused a currency shock and a raising of inflation, which pressure poli-
cymakers to increase interest rates. In other words during the period 2013-2018;
lower are the interest rates, higher is the probability of currency shock crisis.
Akcay and Güngen (2019) agree that the first episode of crisis tendency is
between 2013 and 2014. Policymakers avoided increasing interest rates until 27
January 2014, although there were negative developments in both international
financial conditions and Turkey’s political stability. In particular, it ends the in-
formal ruling coalition between AKP and the Gülen organization. The failed coup
attempt provoked the second episode of the intensification of crisis tendencies in
mid-2016. To counter the impact of a small currency shock and interest rate hike,
policymakers resorted to state-sponsored credit expansion from late 2016 onwards.
The aim was not only to avoid economic recession but also to consolidate polit-
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Figure 18: Risks of falling into a crisis
Data taken from the CBRT database
ical support before the critical 2017 referendum on political regime change. The
economic strategy to overcome crisis tendencies in this second episode was based
on tremendous support to the small and medium-sized enterprises by providing
three-year loans with no payments in the first year (Akcay and Gungen,2019).
Policymakers resume the Credit Guaranteed Fund (CGF)mechanism to tighten
the amount used by commercial banks as collateral; the aim of these policy was to
socialise the financial risk of this loan. The fiscal deficit increased in 2017, due to
temporary tax reductions, continued minimum wage subsidies, and employment
incentives. The outcome was a nominal credit volume expansion amounted to 18
per cent, implying that the AKP government overcame this second economic bot-
tleneck by state-sponsored credit expansion. In turn, falling interest rates would
provide an incentive for domestic consumption, but it will result in further de-
preciation of Lira, however despite the efforts to keep interest rate at low level
at the beginning of 2017 an increasing in interest rate occurred. Depreciation of
TL would also mean increased burden for corporations heavily indebted in foreign
exchange. Monetary policy has been tightened but inflation rose to almost 12
percent during 2017. Despite the trying of stabilize the currency; TL depreciate
of almost 17% during the period September 2016-September 2017 (from 2.93 to
3.45). 5
The third episode was the inevitable currency crisis during the summer of 2018.
5data taken from CBRT data base https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/index.php?/evds/
serieMarket/collapse_2
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The large boost to credit in 2017, led by the Credit Guarantee Fund, lifted growth
that year to very rapid pace.Turkey entered 2018 with an economy running above
potential, a positive credit gap, and high inflation. Large current account deficits,
mainly financed by debt, resulted in a weak net international investment position
and large currency mismatches, especially in the private sector sowing the seeds for
the Balance of Payments (BoP) “sudden stop” in August 2018. The FX liabilities
of the real sector reached 339 billion USD by May 2018 (IIF,2020). Before the
elections in June 2018, current account deficit to GDP ratio exceeded 6 per cent
and the money needed to rollover private and public sector debt for the coming
12 months surpassed 180 billion USD. The desperate search for new funds did not
yield any result and the portfolio flows financing the deficit economy of Turkey
lost pace by 2018 (Akcay and Güngen, 2019). In addiction, political uncertainty
reigns during that period (presidential and parliamentary elections). The value of
lira against dollar plummeted, the fastest drop in the history of lira; in a matter of
just several months, lira depreciated from 3.78 in January 2018 to intraday high
of 7.24 in August 2018 (as of 2 August 2019, USD/TRY is 5.60, and nowadays is
7.47 that is its highest value ever recorded), meaning that Turkish Lira lose more
than 90 percent of its value and fell by almost 40 percent in the only month of
August .
Consumer price index peaked at 25.24% in October 2018 (highest in a decade),
which in fact doubled from August 2017 level. Producer price index saw the largest
spike; from 2-3% in October 2016, it almost hit 50%. International investment
position dropped significantly after August 2018, which saw further decline after
President Erdoğan sacked the CBRT governor. Short-term external debt on a
maturity basis is little over $175 billion ($75 billion of debt matures in 2019).
Interest rates for bank loans and deposits are still very high, this situation has been
a huge strain on the economy; peaked at around 26%; currently, approximately
22% for deposits and 30% for commercial loans(Taskinsoy, 2018).
According to CBRT data, residents not only continued to invest in foreign
stocks and bonds in a similar tempo to previous months but also transferred abroad
massive amounts of their savings through banks between May and August 2018,
residents transferred 17.4 billion USD of their savings abroad. GDP growth on a
quarter to quarter basis, shown in Figure 5, indicates that there was zero growth
in the second quarter of 2018, prior to the currency crisis.
6.3 The post-crisis (late 2018-2019)
After the crisis the first goal was a stabilization of the TL, which consisted of
a dramatic increase in interest rates in September 2018 and the announcement
of the New Economic Program (NEP) as the key document outlining the main
roadmap of policy responses. The NEP assumes that deleveraging has largely been
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completed and that further rebalancing will be achieved through high productivity
growth in the tradable sector, mostly on account of policy initiatives, including
further credit expansion. According to the authorities, tradable sector growth
would result in strong import substitution, reducing external imbalances, while
the expansion of domestic food production and a shift towards renewable sources
of energy should lower food and energy price inflation.
For the last 3 months of 2018 there was a tax reduction in particular in sectors
which experieced more difficulties (automotive and household appliances received
more helps). According with NEP, growth has since resumed, aided by extensive
policy support. Buoyed by expansionary fiscal policy, rapid credit expansion by
state-owned banks, and more favorable market sentiment, the economy registered
positive growth in the first half of 2019 despite the continued sharp decline in
investment. Growth was slightly positive for 2019 as a whole - about 1/4 percent
- despite the large negative carryover effects from the 2018 recession (IMF,2019).
As market pressures abated, and the current account adjusted, the lira stabilized.
Turkish unemployment rate surged to 14.7% in February 2019, which is the
highest level in a decade. Out of the working-age population of 32.3 million,
about 14% or 4.2 million people are unemployed; in 2017, only three million were
unemployed. The biggest jump was in the youth (between 15 and 24 years old)
unemployment rate, surged from circa 17% in 2017 to 23% in 2018 (an increase of
37 percent).
Inflation had reached about 25 percent-five times the target- in October 2018
due, in large part, to high exchange rate pass-through and rising inflation expecta-
tions. But strong negative base effects and a lira recovery have since contributed
to steep disinflation, although inflation expectations remain well above the target.
Following the dismissal of the central bank governor in July 2019 and changes
in senior management in August, the CBRT has delivered large policy rate cuts,
bringing the official repo lending rate to 14 percent. It also began providing lira
liquidity to primary dealers at 100 basis points below the official policy rate and to
all participating banks at rates settled under longer-term FX swaps. CBRT still
continued its monetary easing with a rate cut of 200 basis points in December and
another of 75 basis points in January, thereby reducing the policy rate gradually
to 11.25% due to the fact in period between July and December the net funding
amount provided through open market operations remained low.
Reserves remain low, despite recent increases, encouraging the use of unconven-
tional policies. At the height of the depreciation in 2018, the authorities imposed
measures on the repatriation and conversion of export proceeds, while the Bank-
ing Regulation and Supervision Authority (BRSA) capped banks’ swap positions
to discourage shorting of the lira in the offshore market. Both measures consti-
tute capital flow management measures under the Fund’s Institutional View. In
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late-March 2019, during a period of lira volatility, reports emerged of large FX
interventions through state-owned banks and questions arose over the net reserve
position of the CBRT (IMF,2019). In late 2019 the CBRT has started to rebuild
reserves, including through the export rediscount credit facility under which credit
is provided to exporters in lira and is typically repaid in FX, an indirect form of
FX intervention. On 28 December 2019, to support financial stability and the real
loan growth-linked reserve requirement practice, reserve requirement ratios for FX
deposits and participation funds by were raised by 200 basis points for all maturity
brackets, resulting in withdrawal of FX liquidity from the market. Moreover, the
CBRT decided to apply these ratios 200 basis points lower for banks that complied
with the real loan growth conditions so that these banks would not be affected by
this increase.(CBRT,2020)
With the higher fiscal deficit and tight domestic financing conditions, the au-
thorities increased Eurobond issuance and domestic FX debt issuance, drew down
Treasury deposits, and shortened borrowing maturities. Lira depreciation, higher
interest rates, and lower growth have weighed on the health of the corporate sector.
Lira depreciation and weak domestic demand led to strong import compression and
a marked improvement in the current account, which was also helped by strong
tourism receipts and a normalization of gold imports.
After declining for several years, the primary balance of the central government
fell to zero in 2018 (-2.22% of GDP) worsening in 2019 (-2.71% of GDP)6, lowest
level from the currency crisis of 2001. Central government primary balance is still
increasing also in the first half 2020 led by a rising in central government primary
budget expenditures by 14.8%.
6data taken from CEIC data
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7 Analysis of Turkey 2018 currency crisis
It is difficult to place Turkey 2018 case in one of the three generation model of
currency crisis because all the models have some familiar points with Turkish
episode but also there are some assumption are far from what happened in Turkey
in 2018. But, the model which is closer and I decided to choose to analyze the
currency crisis is Krugman model written in 1979 and refined by Flood and Garber
(1984) due to Krugman tries to identify in government budget deficits the main
source of currency crisis; even if in Krugman model the exchange rate is fixed while




A fundamental proposition of open-economy macroeconomics is that the viability
of a fixed exchange-rate regime requires maintaining long-run consistency between
monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies. “Excessive” domestic credit growth
leads to a gradual loss of foreign reserves and ultimately to an abandonment of
the fixed exchange rate, once the central bank becomes incapable of defending the
parity any longer. A large formal literature has focused on the short- and long-run
consequences of incompatible macroeconomic policies for the balance of payments
of a small open economy in which agents are able to anticipate future decisions
by policymakers. In a pioneering paper, Krugman (1979) showed that under a
fixed exchange-rate regime, domestic credit creation in excess of money demand
growth may lead to a sudden speculative attack against the currency that forces
the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate and the adoption of a flexible-rate
regime. Moreover, this attack will always occur before the central bank would
have run out of reserves in the absence of speculation, and will take place at a
well-defined date. First of all we start with the basic model of Agénor and Montiel
(2008).”Consider a small open economy whose residents consume a single, tradable
good. Domestic supply of the good is exogenous, and its foreign-currency price is
fixed. The domestic price level is equal, as a result of purchasing-power parity, to
the nominal exchange rate. Agents hold three categories of assets: domestic money
(which is not held abroad), and domestic and foreign bonds, which are perfectly
substitutable. There are no private banks, so that the money stock is equal to
the sum of domestic credit issued by the central bank and the domestic-currency
value of foreign reserves held by the central bank. Foreign reserves earn no interest,
and domestic credit expands at a constant nominal growth rate. Finally, agents
are endowed with perfect foresight.” The model is defined by the following set of
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equations:
m− p = y − αi α > 0 (3)
m = γd+ (1− γ)R 0 < γ < 1 (4)
ḋ = µ > 0 (5)
p = e (6)
i = i∗ + ė (7)
All variables, except interest rates, are measured in logarithms. m denotes
the nominal money stock, d domestic credit, R the domestic-currency value of
foreign reserves held by the central bank, e the spot exchange rate, p the price
level, y exogenous output, i∗ the foreign interest rate (assumed constant), and i the
domestic interest rate. Equation 3 relates the real demand for money positively to
real income and negatively to the domestic interest rate. Equation 4 is a log-linear
approximation to the identity defining the money stock as the stock of reserves and
domestic credit, which grows at the nominal rate µ (Equation 5). Equation 6 and
Equation 7 define, respectively, purchasing-power parity and uncovered interest
parity. Setting δ = y−αi∗ and combining Equation 3, Equation 6 and Equation 7
yields
m− e = δ − αė δ > 0 (8)
Under a fixed exchange-rate regime, e and ė = 0, so that
m− ē = δ (9)
which indicates that the central bank accommodates any change in domestic money
demand through the purchase or sale of foreign reserves to the public. Using
Equation 4 and Equation 9 yields
R = (δ + ē− γd)/(1− γ) (10)
and using Equation 5
Ṙ = −µ/Θ Θ ≡ (1− γ)/γ (11)
Equation 11 indicates that if domestic credit expansion is excessive , reserves are
run down at a rate proportional to the rate of credit expansion. Any finite stock
of foreign reserves will therefore be depleted in a finite period of time.
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7.1.2 Flood and Garber 1984
Suppose that the central bank announces at time t that it will stop defending the
current fixed exchange rate after reserves reach a lower bound, Rl , at which point
it will withdraw from the foreign exchange market and allow the exchange rate to
float freely thereafter. To avoid losses arising from an abrupt depreciation of the
exchange rate at the time of collapse, speculators will force a crisis before the lower
bound on reserves is reached. The issue is thus to determine the exact moment
at which the fixed exchange-rate regime is abandoned or, equivalently, the time
of transition to a floating-rate regime. The length of the transition period can be
calculated by using a process of backward induction, which has been formalized
by Flood and Garber (1984).
In equilibrium and under perfect foresight, agents can never expect a discrete
jump in the level of the exchange rate, because a jump would provide them with
profitable arbitrage opportunities. Speculators compare the fixed exchange rate
with the exchange rate that would prevail if the exchange rate were free to float
(shadow exchange rate) and the reserves have fallen to the minimum. If the shadow
floating rate falls below the prevailing fixed rate(ẽ < ē), speculators would not
profit from driving the government’s stock of reserves to its lower bound and
precipitating the adoption of a floating-rate regime, because they would experience
an instantaneous capital loss on their purchases of foreign currency. On the other
hand, if the shadow floating rate is above the fixed rate (ẽ > ē), speculators would
experience an instantaneous capital gain.
To find the solution for the shadow floating exchange rate, which can be written
as
e = k0 + k1m (12)
where k0 and k1 are as-yet-undetermined coefficients and, from (Equation 4),
m = γd + (1 − γ)Rl when reserves reach their lower level. Taking the rate of
change of Equation 12 and noting from Equation 4) that under a floating-rate
regime ṁ = γd yields
ė = k1µ (13)
In the post-collapse regime, therefore, the exchange rate depreciates steadily and
proportionally to the rate of growth of domestic credit.
Substituting Equation 13 in Equation 8 yields, with δ = 0 for simplicity,
e = m+ αk1γµ (14)
Comparing Equation 14 and Equation 12 states that
k0 = αγµ k1 = 1 (15)
From Equation 5, d = d0 + µt.
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Using the definition of m given above and substituting in Equation 14 yields
e = γ(d0 + αµ) + (1− γ)Rl (16)
The fixed exchange-rate regime collapses when the the prevailing parity,ē = e.
From Equation 16 the exact time of collapse, tc, is obtained by setting ē = e, so
that
tc = [ē− γd0 − (1− γ)Rl]/γµ− α (17)
or, because, from Equation 9 and Equation 9,ē = γd0 + (1− γ)R0 ,
tc = Θ(R0 −Rl)/µ− α (18)
where R0 denotes the initial stock of reserves.
7.2 Does the model fit with Turkish data?
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, I had to assume that the exchange
rate is pegged with another currency (for simplicity to find data the chosen cur-
rency is US dollar), while in the reality Turkey has a floating exchange rate regime
even if is Turkish Lira is a managed flexible exchange rate regime (or dirty float) in
which the country’s central bank may occasionally intervene in order to direct the
country’s currency value into a certain direction. This is generally done in order to
act as a buffer against economic shocks and hence soften its effect in the economy.
So, it is an halfway between a fixed exchange rate and a clean float regime. The
data of 2018 in Turkey are summarised in Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9.
Data are not easy to be read, so I summarize the main findings. First of all,
I assume that in Equation 3 and Equation 10 all the value are expressed in rate
of growth, since money supply and GDP are related a growing in GDP coincides
also with an hike in money supply. If the growth in money supply is high enough,
reserves could not drop as the model predict. Money supply rose by more than
15% in the two period preceding the crisis. Interest rate hikes to 24 percent in
September 2018 while six month before were at a level of 12 percent.
The second table shows one month data wherever are available. Also here we
can see a weird behavior of reserves: they have a drop just a little before the
currency crisis and they drop consistently the months after the crash (October
and November 2018) which is reasonable since the TL lira appreciates by 8% and
8,3% in those periods respectively. To have a clearer situation of the movements
of reserves in relation to GDP, domestic credit and exchange rate I plotted two
graphs:
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Domestic credit and GDP (Nominal and Real)
(a)
Exchange rate and foreign reserves (Millions USD)
(b)
Figure 19: Data taken from CBRT and Fed Reserve of St. Louis
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Graphs are not simple to read. Looking in a little deeper way it is possible
to understand that rGDP, nominal GDP and domestic credit moves in a very
similar paths with different amplitude. In the bottom graph foreign reserves drop
in moments when the devaluation of the Turkish Lira is higher, underlying the
nature of the Turkish exchange rate regime. Overlapping the two graphs it is
possible to see that exchange rate reacts one period later than GDP and domestic
credit. Since it is not easy to evaluate the fitness for the model only seeing those
data we should go further using a linear regression similar to this :
Ṙt = β0 + β1ẏt + β2ḋt+ βi
∗
t + ε (19)
and another one that makes the model more coherent with data:
Ṙt = β0 + β1ẏt + β2ḋt + β3i
∗
t + β4ė+ ε (20)
Results on quarterly data with 78 observation give us a good point to start
reasoning how we can improve the model. As mentioned before exchange rate
moves a period later than GDP and domestic credit, so it is plausible that also the
foreign reserves denominated in domestic currency (our target) moves similarly.I
modified the starting model in this way:
Ṙt = β0 + β1ẏt−1 + β2ḋt−1 + β3i
∗
t + β4ė+ ε (21)
The results are shown in Table 5.
The result with lag improve the model, two variables are significant at the level
of 1 percent, the R2 is very high and also the R-Adjusted is high too. What is
not coherent with the model is the value of interest rate that theoretically should
be negative while here in this last regression is positive even if not significant.
In conclusion is that we cannot discard the Krugman model, on the contrary
it explain more than half the movements of the foreign reserve; of course there
multiple motivation that also explain why the model does not explain everything:
the lack of monthly data (only GDP in our case is not available) that could give
a more precise situation of reserve’s trend; maybe some variable that a model like
this do not consider like the volatility due to a balance of payment crisis or GDP
and domestic credit influenced reserves with more than one lag.
Official reserves are usually used to finance imbalances generated in other voices
of the BoP. The import of by domestic resident of foreign products (or in general
assets) represent an outflow that it appears as a debit in the financial account.
In this case, central bank intervene in foreign exchange markets by selling official
reserves. For this reason from the starting model I added another variables which
is the import variation period to period. As mentioned in the paragraph before I















0.002835 0.015604 -0.012467 -0.012095





0.689804 ** 0.1146 0.509506 * 0.162114
(0.223095) (0.229639) (0.211839) (0.175230)
Foreign
interest rate
0.001185 0.003379 0.005731 0.005623




0.184051 0.163718 0.637385 . 0.705806 **





0.494368 *** 0.506656 ***
(0.103309) (0.076004)
R2 0.2184 0.407 0.2823 0.5586
Table 5: Log regressions to compare the model
Significance level: ’.’ 0.1; ’*’ 0.05; ’**’ 0.01; ’***’ 0.001
and domestic credit. The results are shown in the Table 6 and in the appendix
(Figure 26,Figure 27 and Figure 28). The starting model is the regression with
one period lag and exchange rate (Equation 21).
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0.005623 0.005831 0.005007 0.005184
(0.004140) (0.004393) (0.004359) (0.004181)
GDP
Variation)
0.705806 ** 0.739721 ** 0.711015 * 0.653740 *














0.506656 *** 0.504640 *** 0.480368 *** 0.532793 ***
(0.076004) (0.095423) (0.095401) (0.082293)
Imports 0.061434
(0.073252)
R2 0.5586 0.46 0.3485 0.563
Table 6: Log regressions with lags and imports
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Table 6 does not tell much more than the previous table did. Regression with
lags worsen the model, coefficient are not significant and the F-Statistic dropped
and also the R2 goes down meaning that the reserves are not affected by GDP and
domestic credit with a lag higher than one period.
Imports are meaningless in the regression, surprisingly compared to what one
would expect. Usually, if in the previous period the GDP increased the current
account should decrease and vice versa. These movements, therefore, affect the
level of reserves. This result lead me to affirm that Krugman model is already
completed with those variables. The assumption that Turkey is under a fixed
rate regime and the model is simply made with variation period to period of the
variables (while Krugman suppose log-linear equation) probably play an important
rule in the definitions of the whole model, in addiction some variables can not be
measured for example variability and people’s fear in period of rapid devaluation
of a currency which could improve the predictability value of the model.
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8 Conclusion
With this paper, it emerges that Turkey had and still has a lot of vulnerability
that started from the development of depend financialisation. Money lent from
international financial markets mainly financed state borrowing in the 1990s, and
these inflows helped Turkish Lira to appreciate and diminish the competitive at-
tractiveness of many corporations in the longer term. Credit expansion in Turkey,
starting in the early 2000s, brought formerly excluded segments of society into the
loan market and the government decision to open borrowing operation in foreign
currency increases the external debt in USD. Turkey continue along this path for
too much time till the currency crisis of 2018.
Through the first generation model of currency crisis (Krugman), I tried to
give a more complete explanation about the currency crisis and how this model
can predict the movements of the reserves, even with some important constraints.
An analogue lecture could be done for the 2020 of Turkey and the TL in particular
that loses more than 25% against the dollar between January and August and the
Turkish currency was the worst performer throughout the year. The result that the
regression model still explain those movements, even are more highlighted. Real
interest rate is negative inflation year-over-year is by far higher than 10% and the
foreign reserves reached a new low in August (40 billions), that means that in
domestic currencies are almost 290 billions in Turkish Lira while it started year at
a level of 440 billions of TL, this means that Turkey’s gross-currency reserves have
fallen at a much faster pace than the few peers that have also seen a reduction.
Most emerging markets have preserved or increased their cash piles even as the
trade slump undermines export revenue (Bloomberg,2020).
Figure 20: Changing in reserves
Taken from https://www.bloomberg.com/
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The dynamics on output, which is in negative sign for both of the first two
quarters compared to the previous one; and on exchange rate lead to accept once
again the model and also the values of coefficients. Returning on current events
in May interest rate reach the low of 8.25% while there was an boom in domestic
credit growth by almost 40% from March to June with a peak in May and 29
percent y-o-y by August. Until August, according to an estimate by US investment
bank Goldman Sachs, the country has spent $65 billion (e55.2 billion) this year
on managing its currency. As a result, its gross currency buffers have dropped by
more than a third this year.
Timothy Ash, senior emerging markets sovereign strategist at BlueBay Asset
Management on the recent devaluation in august stated ”the hard defense of the
lira around the 6.85 had failed. They blew $65 billion in defense of the lira and
for little benefit as they are now accepting they have to let the lira go weaker
to balance out the external financing requirement”. Even with the opposition
of President Erdogan (who hates hiking interest rates) in September, the CBRT
decided to increase the policy rate by 200 basis points to restore the disinflation
process and support price stability. The Banking Regulatory and Supervision
Agency (BRSA) introduced forbearance measures that relaxed the definitions of
nonperforming loans and Stage-2 loans, making it challenging to assess banks’ true
asset quality.
What the future holds for Turkey? World bank in its economic outlook said
the Turkish economy will decline by 3.8 percent in 2020, led by the massive dete-
rioration in the current account due to its high integration in global value chains
and dependence on tourism and transport two of the most heavily affected sectors
by Covid-19, lower consumption on the demand side, and declines in both services
and manufacturing output. Economic growth could recover to 4 percent in 2021
and 4.5 percent in 2022. Inflation is expected to average nearly 12 percent over
2020 and fall to 9.4% at the end of 2021 and 2022. The current account is ex-
pected to remain in deficit over these years, as exports struggle to fully recover
while global markets continue to suffer from weaker demand. The general gov-
ernment deficit for 2020 is projected to increase to 5.4 percent of GDP. Turkey’s
external risk profile is heightened as gross international reserves have fallen and
can now scarcely cover one year’s national debt service, with much of the reserves
borrowed from the banking sector.
Although Turkey’s vulnerability have been exacerbated during last year, they
are not insurmountable. Turkey must learn from its mistakes made after crises
of 1994,2001 and 2018. They should set the economy on a path to stronger and
more resilient growth moving the focus from short-run growth to medium/long-
term growth. I have two personal suggestions to move Turkey’s focus. The first
one is the stabilization of Turkey’s fiscal deficit (has deteriorated by almost 2% in
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the last two years)and therefore the stabilization of debt. The second one is about
the human capital: Turkey’s population is expected to grow to 90 million and
young compared to advanced economies; government should invest in education
to improved the quality of human capital (high skill);the positive developments
would be able to support a gradual move towards higher value-added industries,
potentially allowing a number of centres of excellence.
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[57] Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M Taylor. “Financial crises, credit
booms, and external imbalances: 140 years of lessons”. In: IMF Economic
Review 59.2 (2011), pp. 340–378.
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Figure 21: Percentage of credit booms turned into crisis
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Table 7: Quarterly Turkish data (Part 1)
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Figure 22: Log regression quarterly measurement
Figure 23: Log regression quarterly measurement and exchange rate
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Figure 24: Log regression quarterly measurement with lags
Figure 25: Log regression quarterly measurement with lags and exchange rate
Figure 26: Starting model with 2 period lags on GDP and on domestic credit
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Figure 27: Starting model with 3 period lags on GDP and on domestic credit
Figure 28: Starting model with import
80
